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INTRODUCTION

On the whole, the labor and employment law of the United States,
is not, in a global comparative sense, very protective of employees and
restrictive of employers.2 United States law does not compare favorably3
with that of other countries in what generally may be termed
"employment protection."4 To be fair, the substantive law "on the
books" is only one measure of how protective a legal system is, and

&

1 Because this Article addresses the most exceptional aspect of United States labor and
employment law, employment at will, it is worth noting another exceptionality early on-a
matter of terminology. See generally Derek C. Bok, Reflections on the Distinctive Character of
American Labor Laws, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1394 (1971). In United States law, there is a dichotomy
between law pertaining to organized labor and collective bargaining, which U.S. lawyers refer to
as "labor law," and law regarding individual employment rights law, which we refer to as
"employment law" and "employment discrimination." IB INTERNATIONAL LABOR
EMPLOYMENT LAWS 33a-1 to a-2 (William L. Keller & Timothy J. Darby eds., 4th ed. 2015);
Richard Michael Fischl, Rethinking the Tripartite Division ofAmerican Work Law, 28 BERKELEY
J. EMP. & LAB. L. 163 (2007); Eugene Scalia, Ending Our Anti-Union Federal Employment Policy,
24 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 489, 489 (2001). Thus, to designate the whole of this area of the law
in the United States, we often refer to "laborand employment law." In the rest of the world, the
term "labourlaw" is understood to encompass both collective and individual rights law. See IA
INTERNATIONAL LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAWS, supra, at 1-4. Consider, for example, the

International Labour Organization, an agency within the United Nations, with 187 member
nations, including the United States, which develops international labour standards. About the
ILO, INT'L LAB. ORG., https://ilo.org/globalabout-the-ilo/lang-en/index.htm [https://perma.cc/
6G6D-RUCD]. Within the ILO, the term "labour" refers to both collective and individual rights.
See id.
2 See generally Stephen F. Befort, The Declining Fortunes of American Workers: Six
Dimensions and an Agenda for Reform, 70 FLA. L. REV. 189 (2018). Professor Befort cites the
following areas in which the United States provides less protection than most developed nations:
workforce attachment, union-management relations, employment security, income inequality,
balancing work and family, and retirement security. Id. at 191. As a very rough measure of this
proposition, consider that the United States has ratified only 14 out of 190 Conventions of the
International Labour Organization, of which 12 are in force, and only 2 of the 8 fundamental
conventions. David Weissbrodt & Matthew Mason, Compliance of the United States with
International Labor Law, 98 MINN. L. REV. 1842 (2014); Ratifications for United States of
America, INT'L LAB. ORG., https://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/fp=1000:11200:0::NO:11200:
P11200_COUNTRY_ID:102871 [https://perma.cc/NC8G-ZU2P]. If we consider only the eight
fundamental conventions, the United States is tied for last place in ratifications among the ILO
member nations. Ratifications of Fundamental Conventions by Country, INT'L LAB. ORG.,
https://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:10011:::NO:10011:P10011_
DISPLAY_BY,P10011_CONVENTION_TYPE_CODE:l,F [https://perma.cc/3JNU-ZR3M].
3 This assumes one considers employment protection to be good.
4 The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development considers the procedures
and costs involved in dismissing individuals or groups of workers and the procedures involved
in hiring workers on fixed-term or temporary work agency contracts. See generally OECD
Indicators of Employment Protection, ORG. FOR ECON. COOP. & DEV., https://www.oecd.org/
[https://perma.cc/GE4Yemployment/emp/oecdindicatorsofemploymentprotection.htm
6QEM].
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compliance, coverage, enforcement, and other issues also are
important.5 Nonetheless, U.S. employment law is among the least
protective of employees among developed nations.6 Indeed, a German
scholar described U.S. labor and employment law as resembling that of
a developing country.7 In no area is this lack of protection more salient
than the law regarding employment termination or discharge.
Employment at will is the default rules regarding employment
termination in forty-nine of the fifty U.S. states, permitting employers
to terminate employees without a job-related reason and without
following any procedures, giving any notice, or providing any severance
pay. 9 In terms of comparative law, employment at will is the most
S Consider, for example, that the United States achieves a high score for coverage of
employees by labor laws (relatively low level of exclusions from coverage). See, INT'L LAB. ORG.,
EMPLOYMENT PROTECTION LEGISLATION: NEW APPROACHES TO MEASURING THE INSTITUTION,
INWORK ISSUE BRIEF NO. 8, 9 (2016), https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/--ed_

protect/--protrav/--travail/documents/publication/wcms 442672.pdf
' [https://perma.cc/
F252-D794]. Additionally, the United States generally does have structures in place to enforce
the labor protections that it provides, so the nation can be considered a fairly strong enforcer of
the laws it has. See, e.g., Samuel Estreicher & Jeffrey M. Hirsch, Comparative Wrongful Dismissal
Law: Reassessing American Exceptionalism, 92 N.C. L. REV. 343, 355-56 (2014). Additionally, the
United States, the fifty states, and many local governments, have a vast array of laws conferring
employment rights on employees and restrictions on employers. Id.
6 See, e.g., Peter Gahan, Richard Mitchell, Sean Cooney, Andrew Stewart, & Brian Cooper,
Economic Globalization and Convergence in Labor Market Regulation: An Empirical Assessment,
60 AM. J. COMPAR. L. 703, 718 (2012) (stating that "the protective strength of labor law in the
United States remains largely static and well below that of other countries").
7 Michael Kittner & Thomas C. Kohler, Conditioning Expectations: The Protection of the
Employment Bond in German andAmerican Law, 21 COMPAR. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 263, 270 (2000)
(citing Dieter Reuter, Gibt es eine Arbeitsrechtliche Methode? Ein Playdoyer far die Einheit der
Rechtsordnung [Is There a Labor Law Method?: A Plea for the Unity of the Legal Order], in
FESTSCHRIFT FOR MARIE LUISE HILGER UND HERMANN STUMPF [FESTIVAL FOR MARIE LUISE
HILGER AND HERMANN STUMPF] 586 (1983)).

8 As a default rule, it also functions in litigation as a rebuttable presumption. Matthew T.
Bodie, The Best Way Out Is Always Through: Changing the Employment At-Will Default Rule to
Protect Personal Autonomy, 2017 U. ILL. L. REV. 223, 233-36 (2017). The Restatement of
Employment Law labels employment at will as a default rule of contract law and a rebuttable
presumption. See RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 2.01 cmt. b (AM. L. INST. 2015). See also
David J. Walsh & Joshua L. Schwarz, State Common Law Wrongful Discharge Doctrines: Up-Date,
Refinement, and Rationales, 33 AM. BUS. L.J. 645, 668-69 (1996). In theory, at least, applicants or
employees can bargain for a variation of employment at will, but in reality, few applicants or
employees are successful in negotiating out of employment at will. Bodie, supra at 235-37
(exploring reasons why employment at will is a very "sticky" default rule). Courts in most states
apply such a strong version of the presumption that it approaches a rule of substantive law. See,
e.g., J. Wilson Parker, At-Will Employment and the Common Law: A Modest Proposal to DeMarginalize Employment Law, 81 IOWA L. REV. 347, 349-52, 350 n.6 (1995) (citing cases
illustrating the denial of contract and tort remedies).
9 See, e.g., Rachel Arnow-Richman, Mainstreaming Employment Contract Law: The
Common Law Case for Reasonable Notice of Termination, 66 FLA. L. REV. 1513, 1522 (2014)
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exceptional aspect of U.S. labor and employment law. Many scholars

and students of employment law have advocated for the replacement of
employment at will with a wrongful discharge statute that imposes a
requirement of good or just cause for firing an employee and procedural
protections.o Such a change would bring U.S. employment termination
1
law in line with that of all other nations with developed legal systems.
In contrast to U.S. employment termination law, the nation's
employment discrimination law12 is one of its greatest achievements in
employment law and civil rights.3 The United States was a pioneer in
the world in this area of law, and its laws were the exemplar for the
employment discrimination laws of other nations.14 Yet, more than half
a century since the enactment of Title VII, U.S. employment
discrimination law has not kept pace with the developing law of other

nations.15 After early years of creativity and innovation in employment
discrimination doctrine, the Supreme Court and the lower courts have

developed doctrine under the statutes that is, on the whole, less
protective of employees and weaker than most scholars and civil rights
advocates think is needed to address the persistent problem ofinvidious
discrimination in employment.16
Employment at will and employment discrimination law have an
interesting relationship. Each imposes significant limitations on the
other. It is well known that the employment discrimination laws are the

most substantial and significant restriction in U.S. law on at-will
termination. Although employers generally do not have to defend
terminations of at-will employees by pleading and proving job-related

&

(stating that "[a]lthough it is generally thought of and treated as a single rule, employment at will
is a multipart doctrine from which three distinct principles can be derived: (1) a presumption
that employment is of indefinite duration . . .; (2) a presumption that employers may terminate
for any or no reason .. . ; and (3) a presumption thatemployers may terminate without notice or
warning").
10 See infra Section I.A.2.
11 See infra note 45 and accompanying text.
12 Of course, a more accurate name maybe "employment anti-discrimination" law. However,
I am opting to use "employment discrimination" law, believing that we can agree upon and
understand the "anti-" part. Generally, I use "employment discrimination law" to denote the
federal statutes and the case law or doctrine developed thereunder.
13 See, e.g., Linda Hamilton Krieger, Afterword: Socio-Legal Backlash, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP.
LAB. L. 476, 488-89 (2000) (discussing the transformative legal regime ofTitle VII that grew out
of the civil rights movement); cf. Pauline T. Kim, Genetic Discrimination, Genetic Privacy:
Rethinking Employee Protectionsfor a Brave New Workplace, 96 Nw. U. L. REv. 1497, 1524-25
(2002) (discussing early successes of Title VII-how it "effectuated a change in norms"-but
recognizing that the impact has diminished over time).
14 See infra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
15 See infra note 52 and accompanying text.
16 See infra Section I.B.3.
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reasons, they must defend terminations that are alleged to be for
prohibited discriminatory reasons. On the other hand, employment

discrimination law is limited and weakened by its interaction with
employment at will in two significant ways. First, employment

discrimination law is sometimes perceived to be largely a body of
wrongful discharge law that is principally protective of members of
groups with histories of employment discrimination-sometimes
erroneously referred to as "protected classes."17This perception detracts
from the important public policy goal of the law-deterring and
eradicating invidious discrimination. Not so obvious is the other
negative impact of the interaction. Courts' solicitude for preserving
employment at will has led them to develop employment
discrimination doctrine that is less robust than it otherwise might be.
Thus, for employment at will and employment discrimination law, each
tends to restrict or weaken the other.
A veritable library of scholarship and numerous law reform efforts
have been directed at abrogating employment at will8 and
strengthening employment discrimination doctrine and case law.19 Yet,
progress on both fronts has been elusive, slow (if ever achieved),20
disappointing, and sometimes fleeting.21 A proposal that could
ameliorate the state of U.S. employment law and render it more like the
more employee-protective laws of other nations22 may be embedded in

17 See infra Section I.B.3. "Protected classes" is improper in referring to groups or classes
covered by Title VII because Title VII covers discrimination based on color, race, sex, religion,
and national origin. Everyone has a color, a race, a sex, and a national origin. Given the broad
definition of religion developed under Title VII, most people have some religious beliefs. See 29
C.F.R. § 1605.1 (2021).
18 See infra Section I.A.2.
19 See infra Section I.B.2.
20 As discussed in detail below, there have been almost innumerable proposals to modify or
abolish employment at will.
21 Employment discrimination law is a big tent of statutes and case law, and the law has
changed a great deal since the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was enacted in 1964 and became effective
in 1965. The Civil Rights Act of 1991 was a "success" in many ways in reforming employment
discrimination law gone awry in the courts. The Act abrogated ten decisions of the Supreme
Court that narrowly interpreted Title VII and the Americans with Disabilities Act. H.R. Rep. No.
102-40, pt. 2, at 1 (1991). However, many of the Supreme Court's and lower federal courts'
interpretations of the 1991 reform Act have not moved the discrimination law in an expansive
and protective direction, consistent with the general legislative intent of the 1991 Act. See, e.g.,
Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338 (2013); Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S.
167 (2009). See generally William R. Corbett, IntolerableAsymmetry and Uncertainty: Congress
Should Right the Wrongs of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 73 OKLA. L. REV. 419 (2021).
22 I do not propose a reform in U.S. law merely to make it less exceptional-more like the
laws of other nations. I realize first that it is laudable to be proud of some aspects of American
exceptionalism. See, e.g., ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (Henry Reeve
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and employment

discrimination law. I have an unconventional proposal-a trade of
sorts.
State legislatures should "fire" employment at will and replace it
23
for
with wrongful discharge statutes requiring good cause
trans., 1899) (1835). However, when a nation is the only one in the world with a particular law, I
think it merits examination. Moreover, I realize that laws should not be viewed in a vacuum.
They are products of the history, culture, and politics of the societies in which they develop and
are not necessarily readily transplantable. See, e.g., Christopher J. Whelan, Labor Law and
Comparative Law, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1425, 1433 (1985) (discussing the views of the great legal
comparativist Sir Otto Kahn-Freund). On the second point, the "rugged individualism" value of
the United States could be seen to support a termination law like employment at will. See, e.g.,
William L. Mauk, Wrongful Discharge:The Erosion of 100 Years of Employer Privilege,21 IDAHO
L. REV. 201, 202 (1985). However, the movement of U.S. employment law over time has been to
riddle employment at will with exceptions, discussed infra, while leaving the increasingly
ineffectual general principle in place. Thus, I propose a change not for the sole or primary
purpose oflessening the exceptionalism of U.S. law in this area, but because I think it would solve
some problems in U.S. employment law and improve it. It also would make the termination law
more consistent with a majority of the American people's values. See, e.g., James A. Gross, The
Broken Promisesof the NationalLaborRelations Act and the OccupationalSafety and HealthAct:
Conflicting Values and Conceptions of Rights and Justice, 73 CHI1-KENT L. REV. 351, 383 (1998)
(asserting that "employment at will ... is an American practice that violates... democratic
values in a most fundamental way [and i]t is a classic example of autocracy at the workplace").
23 Although the United States has adhered to employment at will for a long time, "good" or
"just" cause is not difficult to define. Either "good cause" or "just cause" is defined in many
sources, including the Model Employment Termination Act, the Montana Wrongful Discharge
from Employment Act of 1987, the laws of almost every other nation, and Convention No. 158
and Recommendation No. 119 of the International Labour Organization. See MODEL EMP.
TERMINATION ACT § 1(4) (UNIF. LAW COMM'N 1991) (defining "good cause"); Wrongful
Discharge from Employment Act, 1987 Mont. Laws ch. 641 § 3 (codified as amended at MONT.
CODE ANN. § 39-2-903(5)) (defining "good cause"); Int'l Lab. Org. [ILO], Termination of
Employment Convention, C158 (June 2, 1982), https://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/
fPp=NORMLEXPUB:12100:0::NO::P12100_ILOCODE:C158 [https://perma.cc/6VYZ-WNZ7];
Int'l Lab. Org.[ILO], Termination of Employment Recommendation, R119 (June 5, 1963),
8394 86 9
1 ::NO::P12100_SHOW_
https://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/fp=1000:12100:16255
TEXT:Y: [https://perma.cc/YS6A-QXJDI. Even in the United States, there are substantial bodies
of law regarding interpretation and application of such a standard-particularly regarding
collective bargaining and civil service employment. First, almost all collective bargaining
agreements negotiated by unions vary employment at will and provide good-cause protection.
See, e.g., Roger I. Abrams & Dennis R. Nolan, Toward a Theory of "Just Cause" in Employee
Discipline Cases, 1985 DUKE L.J. 594, 594-95 (stating that "[v]irtually every collective bargaining
agreement contains some such limitations" and "[t]his requirement is so well accepted that often
it is found to be implicit in the collective agreement, even when there is no stated limitation on
the employer's power to discipline"); Martha S. West, The Case Against Reinstatement in
Wrongful Discharge, 1988 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 22 n.111 (stating that "[m]ost collective agreements
require 'cause' or 'just cause' for discharge or discipline. Even in the absence of an express 'just
cause' limitation, arbitrators will imply such a limitation on discharge") (citing F. ELKOURI & E.
ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION WORKS 652 (4th ed. 1985)). Thus, arbitrators have a wealth of
experience in interpreting and applying for-cause termination restrictions. Second, there are
other employees in the United States who can only be fired for job-related cause, such as
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termination. My proposal so far is not novel, as I am only the latest in a
long line of commentators calling for legislative abrogation at the state
level of employment at will. But there is more to my proposal, and that
"more" is the unconventional part-and that is the part that may make
it work. State legislatures should pass wrongful discharge statutes that
abrogate employment at will in response to federal legislation that
exempts discharge claims from coverage under the federal employment
discrimination laws in states that enact such laws. Proposals heretofore
have been for either individual states or Congress to pass a wrongful
discharge statute. Only one state, Montana, has passed such a statute,
and that was in 1987.24 Congress will never impose a general wrongful
discharge regime on the states. The federal government is not going to
be that intrusive in an area in which the states historically have
regulated.25 However, Congress might induce states to enact such
statutes under an approach that is based on cooperative federalism.26
Congress could permit states that enact wrongful discharge statutes that
conform to specified minimum requirements to opt out of the federal
employment discrimination statutes' coverage of termination claims.
This Article develops the rationale for such a proposal, sketches the
basics of a wrongful discharge statute that would satisfy the
requirements for opt out, and addresses some objections that are likely
to be raised to this proposal. I do not attempt in this Article to work out
all the specifics of the ideal wrongful discharge law. A staggering volume

governmental classified civil service employees. See, e.g., Seymour Moskowitz, Employment-atWill and Codes ofEthics: The Professional'sDilemma, 23 VAL. U. L. REV. 33,46 (1988). Thus, civil
service commissions have experience determining good cause for termination under statutes.
24 Montana Wrongful Discharge from Employment Act of 1987, 1987 MONT. LAWS ch. 641,
(codified as amended at MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 39-2-901 to 39-2-914). Beyond states, Puerto Rico
and the U.S. Virgin Islands also do not follow employment at will. See generally Jorge M.
Farinacci-Frn6s, The Searchfor a Wrongful Dismissal Statute: A Look at PuertoRico's Act No.
80 as a PotentialStartingPoint, 17 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 125 (2013).
25 This is my opinion, of course. I admit there are some areas in which the federal government
runs roughshod over state regulation. The U.S. Supreme Court has permitted mandatory
arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act to displace the effect of every other law, including
state laws. For example, the Court held that California law that would have interpreted a
mandatory arbitration clause to permit class arbitration was pre-empted by the Federal
Arbitration Act in Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, 139 S. Ct. 1407 (2019). However, it was the Supreme
Court, the judicial branch, that found pre-emption in that case. The question of moment here is
whether Congress would pass, and the President would sign, a federal wrongful discharge statute
that pre-empts states' employment termination law-employment at will. That ha's not
happened, and I am quite certain it will not. One may counter that Congress has passed, and the
President has signed, many laws that prohibit terminations for specified reasons-the federal
employment discrimination laws and every federal employment law with an anti-retaliation
provision in it. All true, but the step Congress has not taken and will not take is enactment of a
general wrongful discharge statute. This is discussed further infra Section III.A.
26 See infra Part II.
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of scholarship has been written on that subject.27 My purpose is to

demonstrate that the trade-off under a cooperative federal-state
arrangement would be good for U.S. law and society, and it should be
palatable to both employers on the one hand and discrimination victims
and civil rights advocates on the other, thus creating incentives for
states to enact the laws. Part II discusses the twin pillars of U.S.
employment law-employment at will and employment discrimination
law-and explores how each encroaches upon and weakens the other.

Part III sketches a federal-state cooperative approach to "firing"
employment at will and discharging termination claims from the

federal employment discrimination laws. Finally, Part IV addresses
some likely objections to this unconventional proposal.
I.

THE TWIN PILLARS OF U.S. EMPLOYMENT LAW AND THEIR
RELATIONSHIP: PROBLEMS AND A WAY FORWARD

Employment at will and employment discrimination law are, to my
thinking, the twin pillars of U.S. employment law. Employment at will
is the principal source of permitting employers to terminate employees
with little government regulation, and employment discrimination law
28
is the principal government regulation of termination.
The United States is considered, from an international perspective,
to be a hire-and-fire society-a nation with employment termination
law almost devoid of government regulation and unlike that of any
other developed nation in the world.29 The default law regarding
termination in forty-nine of the fifty states is employment at will, which
provides that employers may discharge employees "for a 'good reason,

27 In an article published in 2004, Professor Bird observed that since 1985, at least two
hundred articles had been published that critiqued some aspect of employment at will. Robert C.
Bird, Rethinking Wrongful Discharge: A Continuum Approach, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 517, 518 (2004)
[hereinafter Bird, Rethinking]. He observed that no significant changes had occurred and
characterized this as "an area of employment law scholarship virtually saturated with research
that does not sufficiently impact current doctrine." Id. The volume of scholarship on the topic
since Professor Bird's 2004 article also has been substantial.
28 Of course, terminations are not the only adverse actions prohibited by employment
discrimination laws. In addition to terminations, most such statutes prohibit other employment
actions classified as adverse employment actions. They do not necessarily reach all negative job
actions, as some are considered too de minimis to merit protection. See, e.g., Rebecca Hanner
White, De Minimis Discrimination, 47 EMORY L.J. 1121 (1998).
29 Thomas C. Kohler, The Employment Relation and Its Ordering at Century's End:
Reflections on Emerging Trends in the United States, 41 B.C. L. REV. 103, 103-04 (1999). That
view of termination law in the United States, however, actually is hyperbolic and lacks nuance.
See infra note 47.
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bad reason, or no reason at all."'30 However, there are many reasons
under U.S. employment law for which employers cannot terminate
employees without being subject to liability. While termination law in
the United States31 is not so simple and unregulated as appears at first
blush,32 it is a remarkable fact that U.S. law does not generally prohibit
firing without good cause. Thus, the United States provides less
protection than almost all other nations against the most extreme
adverse employment action, which ends one of the most important
statuses and relationships in American society-one that is central to

full participation as a citizen.
Employment is a status and relationship that makes available many
of the attributes of U.S. citizenship.33 Termination ends gainful
employment and potentially diminishes future income,34 jeopardizes

30 See, e.g., Engquist v. Or. Dep't of Agric., 553 U.S. 591, 606 (2008); Payne v. W. & AtI. R.R.
Co., 81 Tenn. 507, 519-20 (Tenn. 1884), overruled on other grounds in Hutton v. Watters, 179
S.W. 134 (Tenn. 1915). Many sources are cited for this famous or infamous statement of
employment at will.
31 Some of the misperception regarding U.S. termination law stems from the fact that, in the
U.S. federal system, some of the law is federal legislation and case law thereunder, but a great deal
of the termination law is state or local law, and it varies from state to state and even from city to
city. See, e.g., Kittner & Kohler, supra note 7, at 269.
32 See generally Kittner & Kohler, supra note 7, passim; Estreicher & Hirsch, supra note 5, at
355-56.
33 It is not an overstatement to say that termination from employment places in jeopardy
many of the key elements of an American's citizenship. See generally MATTHEW W. FINKIN,
AMERICAN LABOR AND THE LAW: DORMANT, RESURGENT, AND EMERGENT PROBLEMS (Frank

Hendrickx & Roger Blanpain eds., 2019). Professor Finkin joins others in arguing that holding a
job is a crucial attribute of economic citizenship. Id. at 97. It was the idea that employers possess
the power to end this crucial attributeof citizenship that prompted Professor Lawrence Blades to
propose the tort of abusive discharge in his influential article in 1967. Lawrence E. Blades,
Employment at Will vs. Individual Freedom: On Limiting the Abusive Exercise of Employer Power,
67 COLUM. L. REV. 1404, 1404 (1967) (discussing the "threatto individual freedom posed by
employer power"). Termination ends gainful employment and potentially diminishes future
income, jeopardizes standard of living and financial security, and sometimes ruins careers.
Termination deprives a person of one job and generally makes it more difficult to get another
job. See, e.g., J. Hoult Verkerke, Legal Regulation of Employment Reference Practices, 65 U. CHI.
L. REV. 115, 147 (1998) (stating that "[s]carring occurs when employers rely on labor market
signals, such as prior employment history or employment references, to deny a job to someone
who could be profitably employed"). For example, consider the issue of discrimination against
the unemployed-the view that one must have a job in order to be considered for a job vacancy.
See, e.g., Hope Delaney Skibitsky, Note, Jobless in America: Discrimination Against the
Unemployed and the Efficacy of State and Federal Protected Class Legislation, 66 RUTGERS L. REV.
209 (2013). The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission has conducted hearings on the
issue of discrimination against the unemployed. See Press Release, EEOC to Examine Treatment
of Unemployed Job Seekers, EEOC (Feb. 14, 2011), https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/release/
2-14-11a.cfm [https://perma.cc/X5FC-75SU].
34 See, e.g., Estreicher & Hirsch, supra note 5, at 346 n.1 (citing sources regarding the
estimated lifetime loss of earnings caused by termination).
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standard of living and financial security, and sometimes ruins careers.
The financial benefits of employment in the United States are not
limited to salary or wages. Health care coverage and retirement plans
often are linked to one's job; thus, a person without a steady job may
face difficulties in obtaining and maintaining adequate health
insurance, 35 and/or an adequately funded retirement savings plan.36
Because of employees' dependence on employers for such benefits, "the
risk of losing a job is significant over and above the loss of a paycheck."37
Termination deprives a person of one job and generally makes it more
difficult to get another job.38 Emphasizing what is at stake in
termination of employment, the New Jersey Supreme Court explained
job security as follows: "[T]he assurance that one's livelihood, one's

family's future, will not be destroyed arbitrarily; it can be cut off only
'for good cause,' fairly determined."39 This extensive degree of financial
dependence of employees on their employers does not exist in nations
that have free-standing safety nets and coverage plans.40
Beyond the multi-faceted financial difficulties created by job loss,
discharge from employment can damage the physical and mental health
of the person who loses a job.41 Indeed, life in the United States has
35 See generallyRichard L. Kaplan, Who's Afraid of PersonalResponsibility? Health Savings
Accounts and the Future of American Health Care, 36 MCGEORGE L. REV. 535, 540 (2005);
Michael J. Zimmer, Inequality, Individualized Risk, and Insecurity, 2013 WIS. L. REV. 1, 20-24
(2013).
36 See Zimmer, supra note 35, at 21-24.
37 Id. at 24.

38 It is common practice for prospective employers to ask for employment history on
applications and to ask applicants to explain reasons for separation from prior jobs. On the
phenomenon of "scarring," see Verkerke, supranote 33, at 147 ("Scarring occurs when employers
rely on labor market signals, such as prior employment history or employment references, to
deny a job to someone who could be profitably employed."). For example, consider the issue of
discrimination against the unemployed-the view that one must have a job in order to be
considered for a job vacancy. See, e.g., Skibitsky, supra note 33. The Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission has conducted hearings on the issue of discrimination against the
unemployed. See Press Release, EEOC to Examine Treatment of Unemployed Job Seekers, supra
note 33.
39 Woolley v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 491 A.2d 1257, 1266 (N.J. 1985), modified by 499
A.2d 515 (N.J. 1985).
40 See, e.g., Brendan S. Maher & Peter K. Stris, ERISA & Uncertainty, 88 WASH. U. L. REV.
433, 434 (2010) (stating that "[m]ore than other developed nations, the United States relies on
private promises to assure health and retirement security. These promises involve 'employee
benefits'" (emphasis in original)).
41 See, e.g., Kenneth A. Sprang, After-Acquired Evidence: Tonicfor an Employer's Cognitive
Dissonance, 60 Mo. L. REv. 89, 134, n.187 (1995). A pithy quote makes the point about the
devastating effects of being fired: "It's a recession when your neighbor loses his job; it's a
depression when you lose yours." The original source of the quote is a bit murky; it has been
called an economists' joke and attributed to President Harry Truman. Harry S. Truman, in
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become so "work-centered" that one's dignity and sense of worth are
dependent upon one's having a job because many Americans identify
so closely with their jobs.42 Additionally, termination can sever
important relationships with coworkers, imposing a significant
relational harm on fired workers.43
In view of the various losses that fired workers suffer, it is not an
overstatement to say that termination from employment places in
jeopardy many of the key elements of an American's citizenship,44 and
seen in this way, terminations can injure society at large.45
In short, almost all the academic criticisms of employment at will
share the overarching concern that "the at-will rule essentially gives
employers an unchecked right to impose devastating economic and
personal harms on undeserving individuals."46 Termination of
employment, then, would seem to be a matter of no small moment to a
nation with a representative democracy form of government that
depends upon the engagement of its citizens. Yet, employment at will is

Observer, April 13, 1958; Richard A. Posner, When Does a Depression or a Recession End?,
ATLANTIC (Aug. 1, 2009), https://www.thealantic.com/business/archive/2009/08/when-does-adepression-or-a-recession-end/22544 [https://perma.cc/WTM7-6BDV]. Although the quote
often is attributed to President Ronald Reagan, he actually borrowed and modified the quote to
make a different point to his political advantage: "A recession is when your neighbor loses his
job. A depression is when you lose yours. And recovery is when Jimmy Carter loses his." Jessica
Ramirez, Economy: Are We in a Recession or Depression?,NEWSWEEK (Oct. 15, 2008, 8:00 PM),
https://www.newsweek.com/economy-are-we-recession-or-depression-91637
[https://perma.cc/47ZL-5DHE].
42 See, e.g., FINKIN, supranote 33, at 97; PAUL C. WEILER, GOVERNING THE WORKPLACE: THE
FUTURE OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW 49 (1990) (positing that a person's job "is valuable

both because it generates the earnings which probably constitute the major financial support for
the worker and his family, and because work is so important to the personal identity and sense
of self-worth of the employee"); Cornelius J. Peck, Penetrating Doctrinal Camouflage:
Understandingthe Development of the Law of Wrongful Discharge, 66 WASH L. REV. 719, 719
(1991) (observing that Americans are often said to "describe themselves in terms of the jobs they
hold"); Michael S. Knoll, Perchanceto Dream:The Global Economy and the American Dream, 66
S. CAL. L. REV. 1599, 1608 (1993) ("For many Americans much of their identity is tied to their
jobs and to their ability to provide for their families.").
43 See Naomi Schoenbaum, Towards a Law of Coworkers, 68 ALA. L. REV. 605, 641-43 (2017).
44 See FINKIN, supra note 33, at 3-15.
45 Professor Blades, in proposing the tort of abusive discharge, noted the constitutional
limitations imposed on governmental employers, such as restrictions on firing employees for
exercising their rights under the First Amendment. See Blades, supra note 33, at 1431-32.
Professor Frank Cavico advocates for the tort of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy,
arguing that the public policy rationale is subordinate to the goal of reining in the "lawless"
doctrine of employment at will "which sanctions conduct inimical to societal welfare." Frank J.
Cavico, Employment at Will and PublicPolicy, 25 AKRON L. REV. 497, 504 (1992).
46 Daniel J. Libenson, Leasing Human Capital: Toward a New Foundationfor Employment
Termination Law, 27 BERKELEY J. EMPL. & LAB. L. 111, 123 (2006).
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the default termination law of the United States and of no other nation
with a developed labor and employment law regime.47

In contrast to U.S. termination law, the body of employment
discrimination law is one of the great employee-protection and civil8
rights achievements of the nation.4 The employment discrimination
law of the United States, beginning with the enactment of Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964,49 was groundbreaking and established a
model emulated by the European Union and many of its members,

47 See, e.g., Estreicher & Hirsch, supra note 5, at 347 & 348 n.7 (stating that the at-will rule
places the United States "in a singular position among most other developed countries" and citing
numerous other sources); see also Stephen F. Befort, Labor and Employment Law at the
Millennium: A Historical Review and Critical Assessment, 43 B.C .L. REV. 351, 404 (2002)
[hereinafter, Befort, Millennium] (stating that "[t]he United States stands virtually alone among
industrialized nations in failing to provide general statutory protection against unjust
dismissals"); Peck, supra note 42, at 727 & n.48. While this statement is accurate, a more nuanced
examination reveals that some nations have laws that, while not fully at-will, approach the U.S.
law. Israeli termination law is characterized as at-will. See, e.g., Guy Davidov, The Principle-of
Proportionality in Labor Law and Its Impact on Precarious Workers, 34 COMPAR. LAB. L. & POL'Y
J. 63, 73 (2012). In Israeli law, however, the judicial recognition of good faith duties regarding
procedures makes it distinct from employment at will in the United States. See Sharon Rabin
Margalioth, Good Faith and FairDealing in the Individual Employment Relationship: Regulating
Individual Employment Contracts Through Good Faith Duties, 32 COMPAR. LAB. L. & POL'Y J 663
(2011); see also II.B WILLIAM L. KELLER & TIMOTHY J. DARBY, ABA SEC. OF LAB. & EMP. L., INT'L

LAB. & EMP. LAWS, 65-32 (4th ed. 2013). Canadian law requires employers that terminate without
good cause to provide a notice period or severance pay in lieu of notice. See, e.g., Rachel ArnowRichman, Just Notice: Re-Reforming Employment at Will, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1 (2010). Thus,
employers in Canada may fire without good cause, but they may not do it without following any
legal prerequisites. Of the twelve nations surveyed by Estreicher and Hirsch, they note that the
United States and Canada are the only nations lacking national unjust dismissal legislation.
Estreicher & Hirsch, supra note 5, at 445.
The International Labour Organization, of which the United States is a member, along
with 186 other nations, has labor standards on termination that prohibit discharge without "a
valid reason for such termination connected with the capacity or conduct of the worker or based
on the operational requirements of the undertaking, establishment or service" and that require
procedural prerequisites. See Int'l Lab. Org. [ILO], Termination of Employment Convention,
C158 (June 2, 1982), https://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/fp=NORMLEXPUB:12100:0::NO::
158 is
Convention No.
P12100_ILO_CODE:C158 [https://perma.cc/6VYZ-WNZ7].
supplemented by Recommendation No. 166, Termination of Employment. See Int'l Lab. Org.
[ILO], Termination of Employment Recommendation, R166 (June 2, 1982), https://www.ilo.org/
dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:12100:0::NO::P12100_ILO_CODE:R166
[https://perma.cc/X86C-WTJC].
48 See, e.g., Kittner & Kohler, supra note 7, at 276 (referring to the enactment of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 as a "watershed event[]").
49 Title VII was enacted in 1964, but its effective date was July 2, 1965. Civil Rights Act of
1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 716, 78 Stat. 241, 266 (1964) (stating that the effective date shall be
one year after the date of enactment).
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Canada, and other nations.so Moreover, the U.S. courts' interpretations
of the discrimination laws have been influential on the tribunals of
other nations.s1 Indeed, the laws of many nations have been influenced
by U.S. employment discrimination law, particularly with respect to
race and sex discrimination.52 Despite its initial innovation, however,
U.S. employment discrimination law has become languid and not kept
pace with the developments in some other nations.53
An interesting relationship has developed over the decades
between these two pillars of U.S. employment law-employment at will
and employment discrimination law. While both are predominant and
influential overarching concepts in U.S. employment law,54 each also
significantly weakens the other. First, employment discrimination law
has emerged as the most significant and vexatious (to employers)
restriction on the employer's prerogative under employment at will.ss
Termination is one of the adverse actions that employers cannot take
for discriminatory reasons. 56 Ironically, then, despite employment at
50 See, e.g., GrAinne de Burca, The TrajectoriesofEuropean andAmerican Antidiscrimination
Law, 60 AM. J. COMPAR. L. 1, 4-5 & 11-13 (2012); Gerard Quinn & Eilion6ir Flynn, Transatlantic
Borrowings: The Past and Future of EU Non-DiscriminationLaw and Policy on the Ground of
Disability, 60 AM. J. COMPAR. L. 23 (2012).
51 See Kittner & Kohler, supra note 7, at 276 (noting that "tribunals of other nations
frequently discuss United States Supreme Court opinions interpreting [the Civil Rights Act of
1964]").
52 See, e.g., Susan Bisom-Rapp, Exceeding Our Boundaries:TransnationalEmployment Law
Practiceand the Export ofAmerican Lawyering Styles to the Global Worksite, 25 COMPAR. LAB.
L. & POL'Y J. 257, 310-13 (2004).
53 Bnrca, supra note 50, at 3 (positing that "[t]he socially transformative energy of the U.S.
civil rights movement of the 1960s seems to have been drained and the powerful corpus of
constitutional and federal antidiscrimination law that it brought with it has been significantly
weakened following decades of political and legal backlash"). To take one example, the United
Kingdom undertook a comprehensive revision and consolidation of its various discrimination
laws in the Equality Act of 2010. Equality Act FAQs, EQUAL. AND HUM. RTS. COMM'N,
https://www.equalityhumanrights.com/en/equality-act/equality-act-faqs
[https://perma.cc/
ZV86-LA29].
54 While it is obvious that employment discrimination law is a large and complex set of tenets
and theories, employment at will may appear to be a single principle; nevertheless, it is multifaceted. As will be discussed below, there are several tenets associated with employment at will.
See infra Section I.A.1. Moreover, employment at will exerts influence over much of the contract
and tort law applicable to employment termination. See, e.g., William R. Corbett, "You're Fired!":
The Common Law Should Respond with the Refashioned Tort of Abusive Discharge,41 BERKELEY
J. EMP. &LAB. L. 63 (2020).
55 Kittner & Kohler, supra note 7, at 270 (explaining that federal and state employment
discrimination law has enormous influence on nearly every aspect of employment); Fischl, supra
note 1, at 200-01. Professor Fischl has explored the important interplay between employment at
will and employment discrimination law. He states that by the late 1990s thousands of
discrimination cases challenged employers' termination decisions and "[i]ndividual
discrimination suits . .. focus overwhelmingly on discharge." Id. at 200.
56 Other adverse actions also are prohibited for discriminatory reasons. See supra note 28.
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will being the "law on the books," U.S. employers generally function as
though there is a wrongful discharge law that requires a good cause

defense for terminations.57 Thus, employment at will has less real value
to employers than appears from a mere statement ofthe law due in large
part to the employment discrimination laws.58
A second aspect of the relationship between these two foundations
of U.S. employment law is that there are numerous ways in which
employment at will weakens employment discrimination law.59
Although this interaction may be less obvious than the encroachment
of employment discrimination law on employment at will, it is
demonstrable and well known to students of employment
discrimination law. Generally, plaintiffs find it quite difficult to prevail
on employment discrimination claims. Most charges filed with the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) do not result in
a favorable outcome for the claimant.60 Furthermore, plaintiffs in
employment discrimination lawsuits have a notoriously low win rate in

&

57 Kittner &Kohler, supranote 7, at 327 (positing that "[t]his produces a situation in current
personnel departments and in court, which is comparable to the burden of proof demanded'of
employers by German law").
An additional consideration for employers in termination of employees is unemployment
insurance and benefits. See generally Gillian Lester, Unemployment Insurance and Wealth
Redistribution, 49 UCLA L. REV. 335 (2001). I thank Professor Sandra Sperino for suggesting
consideration of this point. Because terminations that result in benefits payments negatively
affect the experience rating of employers, increasing employers' tax rates, employers should-be
incentivized not to lay off workers. Id. at 344-45 (stating that "[s]tates use a number of different
techniques for experience rating, but the common goal is to tax each employer in a manner
proportionate to the costs it imposes on the insurance pool"). The relationship between
employment termination and unemployment insurance and benefits is complex, and a complete
exploration of that topic is beyond the scope of this Article. Several points, however, are
noteworthy. First, it is not clear how effective unemployment insurance is as a disincentive to
employers terminating employees, as the cost of experience rating and higher rates can be
forward shifted to consumers and backward shifted to employees. See id. at 378-83. Second,
unemployment insurance does not provide adequate income security for most terminated
employees. See, e.g., Gary Minda & Katie R. Raab, Time for an Unjust Dismissal Statute in New
York, 54 BROOK. L. REv. 1137, 1180 (1989). Third, partial income replacement for a period of
time does not address all of the harms caused by employment termination. See supra notes 3347 and accompanying text. Finally, it is arguable that employment at will places unnecessary
strain on the unemployment insurance system. See, e.g., Todd H. Girshon, Comment, Wrongful
DischargeReform in the United States: Internationaland Domestic Perspectives on the Model
Employment TerminationAct, 6 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 635, 704 (1992).
Enactment of state wrongful discharge statutes likely would make adjustment of state
unemployment insurance laws both practicable and advisable. The scope and specifics of those
revisions are beyond the scope of this Article.
58 See infra Section I.A.3.
59 See infra Section I.B.2; see, e.g., Fischl, supra note 1, at 201.
60 See Deborah L. Rhode, LitigatingDiscrimination:Lessonsfrom the Front Lines, 20 J.L.
POL'Y 325, 326 (2012).
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the courts. 61 This fact comes as no surprise in light of the substantive
law which, on the whole, is not particularly favorable to plaintiffs.62

Although it is by no means the only thing,63 one matter that has caused
the U.S. Supreme Court and the lower courts to interpret the
discrimination statutes so grudgingly toward plaintiffs is the
employment-at-will doctrine. Solicitous of preserving as much of the
employer's prerogative under employment at will as possible, courts
have interpreted the discrimination statutes in ways that make them less
effective for discrimination plaintiffs. The examples are numerous, and

some are discussed below.64
Thus, it is an interesting state of the law that each of these pillars
of U.S. employment law is the most significant fissure in the other.
Employment at will is less valuable and useful for employers because of
employment
discrimination
law.
Conversely,
employment
discrimination law is less valuable and useful for employees who believe

they are victims of invidious discrimination because of the influence of
employment at will on employment discrimination doctrine.

61 See, e.g., Michael Selmi, Why Are Employment DiscriminationCases So Hardto Win?, 61
LA. L. REV. 555 (2001); Julie C. Suk, Race Without Cards, 5 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 111, 119 n.45
(2009).
62 This is true generally of employment discrimination law. Consider, for example, that
Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1991, in part, to legislatively change the law articulated
in several Supreme Court opinions, all of which were unfavorable to plaintiffs. See H.R. REP. No.
102-40, at 2-4 (1991), as reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 694, 694-96. Of course, this varies
depending on the subset of discrimination law. The law under the Age Discrimination Act has
been particularly bad for plaintiffs. See, e.g., Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 180 (2009)
(holding that the "motivating factor" standard codified by the Civil Rights Act of 1991 does not
apply to the ADEA, and plaintiffs must establish but-for causation); Gen. Dynamics Land Sys.,
Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 584 (2004) (holding that reverse age discrimination claims are not
actionable under the ADEA). The court-developed doctrine was so unfavorable for plaintiffs
under the Americans with Disabilities Act that Congress enacted the Americans with Disabilities
Act Amendments Act of 2008 to change court interpretations of the ADA. ADA Amendments
Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 2, 122 Stat. 3553, 3553-54 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 12101).
63 Professor Selmi suggests a number of reasons for such judicial interpretations, including
the misperception fueled by conservative interest group propaganda that depicts discrimination
cases as easy to win. See Selmi, supra note 61, at 556. Additionally, he posits that a number of
biases of the courts, such as a concern with the potential overbreadth of the ADA and the idea
that many race discrimination cases lack merit, cause the courts to develop law that is unfavorable
to the plaintiffs. Id. at 556-57. To give a specific example, Professor Deborah Calloway opined
that the Supreme Court interpreted the McDonell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973)
pretext analysis as it did in St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993), because a
majority of the Court did not believe the basic assumption on which the prima facie case is
based-that "absent explanation, adverse treatment of statutorily protected groups is more likely
than not the result of discrimination." Deborah A. Calloway, St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks:
Questioningthe Basic Assumption, 26 CONN. L. REV. 997, 997-98 (1994).
64 See infra Section I.B.2.
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Fire at Will

Origins and Proliferation

The genesis of employment at will in the United States has been
fertile ground for discussion and debate among scholars. Rather than
going into extensive detail in attempting to clarify the origins of the
doctrine, I offer a few observations. Poor, beleaguered Horace Gay
Wood, a lawyer and treatise writer, who has become the Aaron Burr of
employment law, being known for one thing,65 bears the brunt of
detractors for declaring
employment-at-will
criticism from
in his treatise on master
land
of
the
employment at will to be the law
and servant in 1877 and citing authority that did not clearly support the
rule.66 While Mr. Wood undeniably wrote in his treatise that
employment at will was the American rule, blaming (or crediting) that
statement as the genesis of employment at will goes too far.67 It is
certainly true that Wood's treatise was cited as authority for the
proposition, 68 but it is hyperbole to brand it the origin of the rule.69
Beyond its origin, Professor Andrew Morriss has chronicled th'e
70
progression of adoption of employment at will by the states.
65 See, e.g., Theodore J. St. Antoine, You're Fired!, 10 HUM. RTS. 32, 33 (1982) (describing the
at-will rule as having "spr[u]ng full-blown ... from [Horace Gay Wood's] busy and perhaps
careless pen").
66 For scholars criticizing the work of Wood, see for example, Clyde W. Summers, Individual
Protection Against Unjust Dismissal: Time for a Statute, 62 VA. L. REV. 481, 485 (1976)
[hereinafter Summers, Individual Protection]; J. Peter Shapiro & James F. Tune, Note, Implied
Contract Rights to Job Security, 26 STAN. L. REV. 335, 341 (1974). There also are defenses of Wood,
such as Mayer G. Freed & Daniel D. Polsby, The Doubtful Provenance of "Wood's Rule" Revisited,
22 ARIz. ST. L.J. 551, 554 (1990). Wood's-statement of the rule was as follows:
With us the rule is inflexible, that a general or indefinite hiring is prima facie a hiring
at will, and if the servant seeks to make it out a yearly hiring, the burden is upon him
to establish it by proof.. .. [I]t is an indefinite hiring and is determinable at the will of
either party, and in this respect there is no distinction between domestic and other
servants.
H. G. WOOD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT 272 (1877).

67 See, e.g., Peck, supra note 42, at 722.
68 See, e.g., Clyde W. Summers, The Rights of Individual Workers: The Contract of
Employment and the Rights of Individual Employees: Fair Representation and Employment at
Will, 52 FORDHAM L. REV. 1082, 1084 (1984).
69 See, e.g., Peck, supra note 42, at 722. Professor Peck points out that the New York "Field
Code" and other sources stated the rule of employment at will. Id.
70 See Andrew P. Morriss, Exploding Myths: An Empirical and Economic Reassessment of the
Rise of Employment At-Will, 59 MO. L. REV. 679 (1994). Professor Richard Bales, considering the
state adoption progression described by Morriss, opined that,
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Regardless of the origin of the doctrine or the reasons for its
adoption in every U.S. state, employment at will is now the default rule
in forty-nine states, with only Montana diverging and enacting a state
wrongful discharge law in 1987.71 Puerto Rico and the U.S Virgin
Islands also do not follow employment at wil.72 Furthermore, the U.S.
Supreme Court has stated that federal government employment is at
will in the absence of contrary legislation,73 although many positions in

public employment, both federal and state, do have procedural
prerequisites and/or good cause protection.74
2.

Statutory Abrogation: Proposals and a Record of Futility

Employment at will is a foundational tenet of U.S. employment law

and has prevailed in all but one state for over a century. It is also the
most reviled principle among employment law scholars. Professor
Clyde Summers sardonically referred to it as the "divine right of
employers."7s The academic commentary calling for its abrogation is

voluminous.76 Employment at will does, however, have its defenders,
even among academics.77 Furthermore, courts sometimes defend

once the first underindustrialized states adopted the rule, other underindustrialized
states would have been compelled to follow suit to remain economically competitive
with the early adopters. Industrialized states would then have been compelled to adopt
the rule, as well, to maintain their competitive advantage in the labor market. The
adoption of the at-will rule by a handful of underindustrialized states, therefore,
precipitated an interjurisdictional race to the bottom ....
Richard A. Bales, Explainingthe Spread of At-Will Employment as an InterjurisdictionalRace to
the Bottom ofEmployment Standards,75 TENN. L. REV. 453, 455 (2008).
71 MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 39-2-901 to 39-2-914 (2021).
72 See generallyFarinacci-F6rn6s supra note 24.
73 Engquist v. Or. Dep't of Agric., 553 U.S. 591, 606 (2008).
74 See supra note 23. See generallyJoseph E. Slater, The "American Rule" That Swallows the
Exceptions, 11 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 53, 83 (2007).
75 Clyde w. Summers, Employment at Will in the United States: The Divine Right of
Employers, 3 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 65 (2000) [hereinafter Summers, Divine Right].
76 See, e.g., Summers, Individual Protection,supra note 66, at 485; Arnow-Richman, supra
note 9, at 1522.
77 The most cited and discussed academic defense of employment at will is Richard A.
Epstein, In Defense of the Contractat Will, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 947 (1984). See Peter Linzer, The
Decline of Assent: At-Will Employment as a Case Study of the Breakdown of PrivateLaw Theory,
20 GA. L. REV. 323, 409 (1986) (calling Epstein "the most prominent academic defender of
economic libertarianism"). Professor Epstein's defense of the doctrine is based principally on a
libertarian freedom-of-contract rationale with some law-and-economics rationale blended in.
Epstein argues, essentially, that the freedom of contract afforded by the at-will rule is mutually
beneficial to employers and employees; "the employer is the full owner of his capital and the
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employment at will in terms suggesting that the nation's free-market
economy would be jeopardized without it.78 One may question whether
employment at will is so crucial to a robustly performing market-based
economy. The United States is the only nation that adheres to at-will
employment,79 and there are numerous nations that have generally
good economic performance without employment at will, such as
Germany. 80 Having noted the prodigious debate, I will put aside for the
moment the question of whether employment at will should be
statutorily abrogated and examine the record of futile attempts to

accomplish that feat.
Legion are the proposals to bring the United States into conformity
with the rest of the world by enacting statutes that require good or just
cause for termination.81 As one commentator expressed it, wrongful
discharge statutes have been viewed at various times by commentators
as the "deus ex machina of employment law."82 Regardless of the merits
of that position, no other state is going to join Montana in enacting a
wrongful discharge statute in the foreseeable future.83 I will support that
prediction with evidence from the historical record and brief
consideration of why that record is as it is. Moreover, the limited
experience in the United States with states that have enacted statutory
schemes affecting employment at will demonstrates that the statutes do
not clearly give employees more protection or redress than the common
law schemes that they replace.
Most proposals to statutorily displace employment at will have
been proposals for states to enact laws, such as the Uniform Law

employee is the full owner of his labor, the two are free to exchange on whatever terms and
conditions they see fit." Epstein, supra, at 955. As part of Epstein's broader libertarian and lawand-economics agenda, generally government regulation should be limited and market forces
should be left in play.
78 Bammert v. Don's Super Valu, Inc., 646 N.W.2d 365, 369 (Wis. 2002) (stating that
employment at will "is central to the free market economy and 'serves the interests of employees
as well as employers' by maximizing the freedom of both").
79 See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
80 See, e.g., Kittner & Kohler, supra note 7. However, as comparative law scholars, such as
Otto Kahn-Freund, have cautioned, one must be cautious in asserting that law which functions
well in one society can be transplanted to another society where it also will function well. See,
e.g., Christopher J. Whelan, Labor Law and Comparative Law, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1425, 1433-37
(1985).
81 See, e.g., Bird, Rethinking, supranote 27, at 517-18 (describing the prodigious scholarship
on employment at will).
82 Parker, supra note 8, at 370.
83 See Bird, Rethinking, supra note 27, at 523 (positing that no change will occur because it
"would require an immense transformation of well-settled statutory and common law").
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Commission's Model Employment Termination Act.84 Some, however,
have been proposals for Congress to abrogate employment at will by
federal legislation.ss It is almost a certainty that any legislative change
in employment at will would have to occur at the state level.
Employment at will, as followed by forty-nine states, is not federal law;

it is state law. Despite ambitious proposals for Congress to pass federal
legislation abrogating employment at will, that is not going to happen.
This is not a matter of Congressional authority, but Congressional will
and restraint. As a matter of respect for federalism, Congress is not
going to invade that area of state regulation.86
Turning then to the states, only Montana, has enacted a statutory
scheme abrogating employment at will, and that occurred in 1987.87 It
is worth noting about the Montana experience both the conditions that
prompted the adoption of the statute and the effect that it has had on
the law of termination. Employers and their insurers were the principal
proponents who lobbied the state legislature to enact the legislation, and
they did so because employers were losing termination cases under
common law theories, principally a "double-barreled tort" theory of
wrongful discharge in violation of public policy and breach of an
implied covenant of good faith, and facing large and unpredictable
awards.88
We are decades past the vibrant period of the 1970s and 1980s
when courts throughout the nation aggressively engaged in the
development of common law contract and tort theories that restricted
employment at will.89 During that time period, numerous state courts
recognized one or more of the following common law theories that

&

84 See, e.g., Robert C. Bird, Do Wrongful-DischargeLaws ImpairFirm Performance?,52 J.L.
ECON. 197, 197 n.1 (2009).
85 See sources cited infra note 230.
86 See Bird, Rethinking, supra note 27, at 524 (stating that "[p]erhaps only sweeping
congressional action, an extremely unlikely possibility given the long entrenchment of
employment at will, could enact just cause reform").
87 MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-901 to 39-2-914 (2021).
88 See, e.g., Arthur S. Leonard, A New Common Law of Employment Termination, 66 N.C. L.
REV. 631, 664-68 (1988); Marc Jarsulic, ProtectingWorkersfrom Wrongful Discharge:Montana's
Experience With Tort and StatutoryRegimes, 3 EMP. RTS. &EMP. POL'Y J. 105 (1999).
89 See, e.g., Bird, Rethinking, supranote 27, at 521-22; Peck, supranote 42, at 725-34; Cavico,
supra note 45, at 497 (describing the "erosion of the conventional employment at will doctrine
and the concomitant creation of statutory and common law exceptions to its dictate"); Leonard,
supra note 88, at 647 ("Over the past two decades judicial development of common-law
exceptions to the presumption of at will employment has been extraordinary. . . ."); Theodore J.
St. Antoine, ADR in Labor and Employment Law During the Past QuarterCentury, 25 A.B.A. J.
LAB. & EMP. L. 411, 412 (2010) (stating that "beginning in 1980, came a flood of court decisions
that ultimately reached every state except Florida, Louisiana, and Rhode Island and imposed at
least some limitations on the absolutist reign of at-will employment").
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narrowed the scope and impact of employment at will: implied contract,

contracts based on handbooks and policy manuals, breach of the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and wrongful discharge in
violation of public policy.90 So vigorous were the courts in some states
in creatively developing the common law at that time that it has been
described as an attack or assault on employment at will.91 So significant
were the common law developments that, when combined with
statutory efforts such as the Montana Wrongful Discharge Act and the
ultimately moribund Model Employment Termination Act, several
commentators predicted the imminent demise of employment at will.92
From today's perspective, those predictions appear recklessly bold, as it

90 Timothy J. Coley, Contracts, Custom, and the Common Law: Towards a Renewed
Prominencefor ContractLaw in American Wrongful DischargeJurisprudence,24 BYU J. PUB. L.
193, 195-96 (2010); David J. Walsh &Joshua L. Schwarz, State Common Law Wrongful Discharge
Doctrines:Up-Date, Refinement, and Rationales,33 AM. BUS. L.J. 645, 646 (1996).
91 Indeed, Walter Olson characterized Professor Lawrence Blades's important article
proposing the tort of abusive discharge as having launched an academic assault on employment
at will. Walter Olson, The Trouble with Employment Law, 8 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 32, 32 (1999)
("Lawrence Blades ... kicked off the modern revolution in state employment law with his article
in the Columbia Law Review in 1967 launching the attack on employment at will. The resulting
intellectual insurgency, which soon spread to pretty much every law faculty, was to transform
American employment law quite dramatically.").
It is difficult in looking back on that period to discern what confluence of events,
conditions, and forces caused such a creative thrust by the courts. Some have posited that the
courts acted because collective bargaining had collapsed as a regime for regulating the American
workplace. See, e.g., Clyde Summers, Effective Remedies for Employment Rights: Preliminary
Guidelines and Proposals, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 457, 459-60 (1992) [hereinafter Summers, Effective
Remedies]. However, the decline in union representation and collective bargaining had been
occurring for years before. See, e.g., Robert J. Flanagan, NLRA Litigation and Union
Representations, 38 STAN. L. REV. 957, 981-82 (1986). However, it is plausible that the Wagner
Act regime had reached a level ofdemise by 1980 that prompted the courts to act. In 1980, union
density was down to about eighteen percent in the overall workforce (public and private). Id. at
981. It also is possible that the flurry of legislative enactments, beginning with the Equal Pay Act
in 1963 and Title VII in 1964 and continuing for over a couple of decades, emboldened the courts.
See generally Summers, Effective Remedies, supra, at 458 ("The trend did not begin with the
employment at will cases but can be traced back at least to the Equal Pay Act of 1963, Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978 (PDA) and
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA). Other acts building upon this
statutory trend included the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (OSH), and the
Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA)."). See also MARK A. ROTHSTEIN,
CHARLES B. CRAVER, ELINOR P. SHROEDER, ELAINE W. SHOBEN, &

L.

CAMILLE HSBERT,

EMPLOYMENT LAw 728 (5th ed. 2015) (stating that enactment of civil rights laws in the 1960s
"gave further support to the concept that unchallenged employer prerogative in hiring and firing
decisions had to give way to other social interests").
92 Consider, for example, the following prediction from 2000: "The future of employmentat-will, then, is that it has no future." Deborah A. Ballam, Employment-at-Will: The Impending
Death of a Doctrine, 37 AM. BUS. L.J. 653, 687 (2000); see also Cavico, supra note 45, at 497
(explaining that the growing momentum of court development ofthe public policy tort exception
"point[s] to the eventual demise of the employment at will doctrine").
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has been clear for a couple of decades now that the common law
"assault" on employment at will subsided around 1990.93 Employment
at will is stronger now than it was thirty years ago, 94 as many of the
common law developments have been diluted or overturned.95 For all
the common law developments of the 1970s and 1980s, the decades after
that were marked by substantial retrenchment.96 Now it is hard to
imagine circumstances that would prompt the powerful political actors
to advocate for enactment of such a statute in any state today.97
Moreover, advocates of such laws should consider that the Montana

experience has not, by some accounts, produced better recoveries for
plaintiff employees.98 Although the only state general wrongful
93 See, e.g., Cynthia L. Estlund, The Changing Workplace: Wrongful DischargeProtectionsin
an At-Will World, 74 TEx. L. REV. 1655, 1688 (1996) [hereinafter Estlund, The Changing
Workplace] ("The argument that wrongful discharge law has eviscerated employment at will is
simply overstated."); Donald C. Dowling, Jr., The Practiceof InternationalLabor & Employment
Law: Escort Your Labor/EmploymentClients into the Global Millennium, 17 LAB. LAW. 1, 13-14
(2001) ("U.S. employment lawyers say that America's employment at will has eroded away, but
theirs is a historical, not an international perspective. By comparison to other countries,
employment at will is alive and well in the U.S.").
94 Cf. Libenson, supranote 46, at 127 (stating that, despite the exceptions, "a powerful ghost
still looms").
95 See, e.g., Rowe v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 473 N.W.2d 268, 273-75 (Mich. 1991)
(distinguishing Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mich., 292 N.W.2d 880 (Mich. 1980));
Guz v. Bechtel Nat'l, Inc. 8 P.3d 1089 (Cal. 2000) (limiting the effect of Pugh v. See's Candies,
Inc., 171 Cal. Rptr. 917 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1981)); Pauline T. Kim, PrivacyRights, Public
Policy, and the Employment Relationship,57 OHIO ST. L.J. 671, 680 (1996) ("Despite the many
calls for reform, the at-will rule has retained its vitality and, if anything, has been regaining
strength in recent years."); Summers, Divine Right, supra note 75, at 85 ("[T]he trend in the last
ten years has been toward more employer dominance."); see also Parker, supra note 8, at 350-51
(discussing the scrutiny of employment at will during the 1970s and 1980s, but concluding that
courts have not developed coherent tort and contract law regarding the doctrine).
96 However, it also is true that many ofthe common law theories, such as wrongful discharge
in violation of public policy, are still recognized in most states, even if not applied with the same
employee-friendly fervor of that period. Perhaps the most significant and lasting erosion of that
period has been the enactment of many whistleblower statutes at both the federal and state level.
See, e.g., Elletta Sangrey Callahan & Terry Morehead Dworkin, The State of State Whistleblower
Protection,38 AM. Bus. L.J. 99 (2000).
97 Alan B. Krueger, The Evolution of Unjust-Dismissal Legislation in the United States, 44
INDUS. & LAB. RELS. REV. 644, 659 (1991) (stating that "the prospects for passage of unjustdismissal legislation are linked to the erosion ofthe common law employment-at-will doctrine");
Parker, supranote 8, at 373; Blades, supranote 33, at 1434 ("Suffice it to say that general statutory
limitations on the employer's right of discharge are unlikely to be enacted so long as there is no
strong lobby to promote them.").
98 See, e.g., Parker, supranote 8, at 371-72 (stating that "[t]he Montana statute has essentially
gutted fundamental common law protections and theories of recovery"). Although the Montana
Wrongful Discharge from Employment Act is the only state wrongful discharge law enacted,
other state laws have been enacted that affected recovery under common law theories. Consider
the euphemistically named Arizona Employment Protection Act. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 23-1501
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discharge law in the United States may have, on balance, produced a
better regime than the one it replaced,99 the experience also suggests a
need for ensuring certain protections in a state statute that takes from
employees other rights, such as the proposal in this Article.
Employment
Model
Law Commission's
Uniform
The
has not
1991,
in
promulgated
was
which
Termination Act (META),

been adopted by a single state.10 0 One commentator noted that between
1980 and 1992, bills that were variants of the META were introduced in
forty-two state legislatures.101 Professor Befort observes that the
fundamental impediment to adoption of the META is that it does not
offer employers "an adequate trade-off for their loss of the at-will
prerogative."102
In short, no other state in the nation is going to abrogate
employment at will unless conditions arise similar to those in Montana
in 1987 to cause businesses to lobby a state legislature for such a change.
Employees do not have an organized and powerful lobby to promote
such legislation.103 The conditions that existed in Montana seem
unlikely to emerge in the current legal landscape given the

retrenchment of state courts on the common law contract and tort
theories impinging on employment at will. Moreover, courts adjudicate
fewer discharge and other employment claims than in the past because
of the prevalent use of mandatory arbitration agreements by employers
and the Supreme Court's enforcement of such clauses in the face of any

(2021). See generally Marzetta Jones, Note, The 1996 Arizona Employment Protection Act: A
Return to the Employment-At-Will Doctrine,39 ARIZ. L. REV. 1139 (1997) (describing the act as
the Legislature's response to the trend away from employment-at-will that began in the mid1980s). The Arizona Act was enacted by the state legislature, in part, to contain the state supreme
court's expansion of the WDVPP tort after the court decided Wagensellerv. ScottsdaleMemorial
Hospital, 710 P.2d 1025 (Ariz. 1985). The Arizona Act, despite its name, appears to have done
more to benefit employers than employees, although it is unclear whether it was very detrimental
to employees. See generallySteven E. Abraham, The ArizonaEmployment ProtectionAct: Another
"Wrongful DischargeStatute" That Benefits Employers?, 12 EMP. RTS. &EMP. POL'Y J. 105 (2008);
Jenny Clevenger, Comment, Arizona's Employment ProtectionAct: Drawinga Line in the Sand
Between the Court and the Legislature, 29 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 605, 605 (1997) (stating that the act
"effected dramatic changes ... halting, and, in some instances, reversing the expansion of
employee rights in Arizona and severely limiting recovery in tort where those rights are
violated").
99 See Donald C. Robinson, The First Decade of JudicialInterpretation of the Montana
Wrongful Discharge from Employment Act (WDEA), 57 MONT. L. REV. 375, 422 (1996)
(concluding that "the Montana WDEA has in fact resulted in a workable scheme that is
understandable and predictable").
100 See Befort, Millennium, supra note 47, at 426.
101 See Jarsulic, supranote 88, at 105.
102 Befort, Millennium, supranote 47, at 427; see also Bird, supra note 86, at 197 n.l; Libenson
supra note, 46, at 113-14.
103 See supranote 97.
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challenge.104 In short, the conditions conducive to a state's enacting
wrongful discharge legislation are unlikely to arise again as they did in
the 1980s in Montana.
3.

Weakened by Employment Discrimination Law

I devote little argument in this Article to persuading that
employers should be deprived of their "divine right," as Professor
Summers put it, ofterminating employees without good cause. The case
for why the United States should not cling to a principle followed by no
other nation with a developed system of employment law has been
made many times over. 105 Instead, I add to those arguments the point
that employment at will has become so riddled with exceptions that it
is a divine right of far less earthly value than is often assumed.
Employers in the United States do not function in making termination
decisions as if employment at will is the law, although employment at
will remains a powerful tool for employers in litigation.106 Employment
discrimination law was the first major limitation of employment at will,
and it led to many others.107
Given that employment at will is the default termination law in
forty-nine states, it should be expected that employers in those states
should be able to fire at-will employees without giving any thought to
stating reasons for the terminations or any concern to the prospects for
litigation. But that is not the way employment law in the United States
works as a practical matter; reasonably risk-averse employers cannot
function in that way. The employment discrimination laws are the most
significant limitation on employer prerogative to terminate.108

104 See, e.g., Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018).
105 See supra text accompanying notes 29-47.
106 I thank Professor Sullivan for pointing out the importance of making the distinction
between the value of employment at will to employers ex ante and ex post in relation to
termination decisions.
107 Befort, Millennium, supranote 47, at 391-92.
108 See, e.g., Kittner & Kohler, supra note 7, at 266-67; Fabio Pantano, Anti-Discrimination
Law and Limits of the Power of Dismissal:A ComparativeAnalysis of the Legislation and Case
Law in the United States and Italy, in 46 IUS GENTIUM: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON LAW
AND JUSTICE: GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW - THE ROLE OF THE JUDICIARY 193, 194 (Laura

Pineschi, ed., 2015) ("Within American law, the dialectic between the common law 'employment
at will' doctrine and statutory anti-discrimination provisions constitutes the core of American
jurisprudence on the limits to the employers' power to terminate the employment relationship.").
Of course, employment discrimination law is not limited to terminations, but covers other
adverse employment actions.
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Although this interaction has existed since the effective date of Title VII
in 1965, the limitation has become more pervasive and salient in recent
decades. Most discrimination claims in the early years of discrimination
law were not discharge claims, but now, and in the last three decades, a
majority of claims include termination as at least one of the adverse
employment actions on which the claim is based.I09 The shift from a
preponderance of refusal-to-hire claims to a preponderance of
termination claims occurred as the law progressively achieved a
purpose of opening employment opportunities to those to whom they
had been discriminatorily denied,110 although discrimination in hiring
certainly persists. The prevalence of discharge claims in employment
discrimination has led to an understanding that employment
discrimination law is the most significant wrongful discharge law in the
United States.111 The increasing use of employment discrimination law

as a vehicle to seek redress for terminations is a significant reason that
employers do not enjoy the freedom and unbridled discretion that the
11 2
employment-at-will rule suggests.
Employers with any knowledge of the law or any inclination td
consult an attorney before terminating an employeel3 would not think
it prudent to proceed with the termination without first confirming that
There are, of course, reasons beyond legal limitations for employers not to fire employees,
including replacement costs and the unpleasantry of firing. Nonetheless, other nations have
considered government regulation necessary.
109 See, e.g., Bases by Issue (Charges filed with EEOC) FY 2010-FY 2020, EEOC
https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/bases-by_issue.cfm [https://perma.cc/EC96YXSLI. See generally John J. Donohue III & Peter Siegelman, The Changing Nature of
Employment DiscriminationLitigation,43 STAN. L. REv. 983, 1015 (1991) (noting that "[h]iring
charges outnumbered termination charges by 50 percent in 1966, but by 1985, the ratio had
reversed by more than 6 to 1"); Kittner & Kohler, supranote 7, at 278; Laura Beth Nielsen, Robert
L. Nelson, & Ryon Lancaster, Individual Justice or Collective Mobilization? Employment
DiscriminationLitigationin the Post Civil Rights United States, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 175,
177-80 (2010).
110 See Donohue & Siegelman, supra note 109, at 1015 (observing that "[a]ssuming that
concrete improvements have occurred, one might expect to see a significant shift in the nature
of employment discrimination cases as minorities and women no longer need to complain about
blanket exclusions from good jobs-that battle has, by now, largely been won-but now complain
more commonly of being fired from these better jobs").
111 See, e.g., George Rutherglen, From Race to Age: The Expanding Scope of Employment
DiscriminationLaw, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 491, 504 (1995) (stating that "the increase in claims of
discriminatory discharge, to about 86 percent of charges filed with the EEOC, has made all of
employment discrimination law look more like the law of wrongful discharge"); see also Kittner
& Kohler, supra note 7, at 281 (stating that "[i]t may be that Title VII and its adjuncts have
become the functional equivalents of wrongful discharge legislation").
112 See, e.g., Kittner &Kohler, supranote 7, at 327.
113 As Professor Fischl suggests, a great headache of management-side attorneys is that many
of their clients call them after, not before, discharging an employee. See Fischl, supra note 1, at
187.
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there was a job-or business-related reason and ensuring that the
reason could be substantiated in the event of litigation."4 Consider a
hypothetical in which someone at a business calls the firm's
employment lawyer and says, "I have a supervisor who wants to fire an
employee named Pat. Should I be concerned about a lawsuit?" The
attorney could answer, "No, you may fire Pat with little or no concern
about liability because this is an employment-at-will state." However,
no knowledgeable and prudent attorney would give such an answer.
Assuming the employee to be at will, which describes most employees
in the United States, the attorney would begin asking questions about
Pat,"5 inquiring about, race, color, sex, national origin, religion, age,
disabilities, and maybe even protected genetic information. After
addressing the characteristics covered by the federal employment
discrimination laws, the attorney might need to address other
characteristics covered by the particular state or local employment
discrimination law. If the attorney learns that Pat is in a group against
which there is a history of discrimination, for example, if Pat is African
American or female, the attorney will caution about the risk of a race or
sex discrimination claim. Of course, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 does not cover only one race or one sex, 116 but what have been
labeled "reverse discrimination" claims, in which the plaintiff is not a
member of a historically discriminated against group,"? sometimes are
more difficult to win than "traditional discrimination" claims.118

114 Kittner & Kohler, supra note 7, at 327.
115 A different way for the attorney to address the client's question would be simply to ask
why the employer wanted to fire Pat. That, however, is not a question closely tied to the law.
Under the employment-at-will doctrine, an employer is not required to state or defend reasons
for a termination unless there is some evidence that the reason is one that is expressly and
specifically prohibited by law. Thus, asking questions about Pat explores whether the employer
is likely to be required to state and defend a reason for termination.
116 See, e.g., McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976).
117 See Charles A. Sullivan, CirclingBack to the Obvious: The Convergenceof Traditionaland
Reverse Discriminationin Title VII Proof, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1031, 1035-36 (2004).
118 For example, some courts impose additional requirements to the McDonnell Douglas
prima facie case, requiring proof of background circumstances that suggest discrimination was
likely. See, e.g., Duffy v. Wolle, 123 F.3d 1026, 1036 (8th Cir. 1997), abrogatedby Torgerson v.
City of Rochester, 643 F.3d 1031 (8th Cir. 2011); Parker v. Balt. & Ohio R.R., 652 F.2d 1012, 1017
(D.C. Cir. 1981). See generally Donald T. Kramer, Annotation, What Constitutes Reverse or
Majority Race or National OriginDiscriminationViolative ofFederal Constitution or StatutesPrivate Employment Cases, 150 A.L.R. FED. 1 (1998); Sullivan, supra note 117, at 1065-71
(discussing courts' opinions and logic surrounding background circumstances and noting that
the jurisprudence is "amorphous"); Timothy K. Giordano, Comment, Different Treatmentfor
Non-Minority Plaintiffs UnderTitle VII: A Callfor Modificationof the Background Circumstances
Test to Ensure That Separateis Equal, 49 EMORY L.J. 993, 1001-11 (2000).
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Employment discrimination law necessarily must impinge on
19
employment at will to some extent.1 An employer cannot fire an
employee (or take other adverse employment actions) for a bad reason
listed in the statutes without potentially incurring liability.120 Thus,
federal employment discrimination law "operate[s] against the
Although
employment."121
at-will
of
backdrop
presumed
discrimination law makes only a limited formal incursion on
employment at will, it arguably impinges more significantly in

numerous informal ways. Employers who are sued under a federal
employment discrimination statute have their best chance of winning if
they can offer good (job-related) reasons for their adverse employment
actions.122 For example, the most important proof structure in
employment discrimination law is the pretext framework developed by
the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green.123 In that
proof structure, after a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of

discrimination, thie burden of production shifts to the defendant
employer to present evidence of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason
for the adverse employment action that it took.124 Thus, in a termination
case, an employer may not stand upon employment at will and contend
that it does not have to give a reason to justify its decision to discharge
the plaintiff employee. An employer's insistence upon its prerogative to
discharge at will at stage two of the pretext analysis will result in an
unrebutted prima facie case of discrimination and judgment for the

119 Theodore Y. Blumoff &Harold S. Lewis, Jr., The Reagan Court and Title VII: A CommonLaw Outlook on a Statutory Task, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1, 71 (1990); Chad Derum &Karen Engle, The
Rise of the Personal Animosity Presumption in Title VII and the Return to "No Cause"
Employment, 81 TEx. L. REv. 1177, 1196 (2003) (discussing the tension between camps of
legislators, during debate on the Civil Rights Act of 1964, over the role of Title VII in a legal
regime in which employment at will was the dominant law regarding terminations).
120 Blumoff & Lewis, supra note 119, at 70.
121 Mardell v. Harleysville Life Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1221, 1233 (3d Cir. 1994), cert. granted,
vacated, remanded, 514 U.S. 1034 (1995); see also Kenneth G. Parker, Note, After-Acquired
Evidence in Employment Discrimination Cases: A State of Disarray, 72 TEX. L. REv. 403, 430
(asserting Congress intended for Title VII to alter employment at will only "slightly").
122 Blumoff & Lewis, supranote 119, at 70-71 (stating "[Title VII] creates caution where none
was necessary before"); Kittner & Kohler, supra note 7, at 281 (observing that "the effective
avoidance ofliability encourages employers to meet discharge complaints with a comprehensive
justification of the grounds that legitimate an employee's dismissal").
123 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). The McDonnellDouglas pretext
framework is one of two applied under Title VII, the other being the statutory mixed-motives
framework, adapted by Congress from the analysis articulated by the Court in Price Waterhouse
v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989). See infra Section I.B.1. However, the pretext framework was the
first developed by the Court, and it has been used more often than the other. Furthermore, mixed
motives is not applicable under the Age Discrimination Act, and it may not be applicable under
the Americans With Disabilities Act.
124 Tex. Dept. of Cmty. Affs. v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
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plaintiff.125 Commentators have noted the incursion on employment at
will represented by the McDonnell Douglas pretext framework.126
Professor Fischl has argued that the at-will mindset has been the
impetus for the courts and agencies to develop these proof frameworks
that "rest on a series of highly contestable assumptions" and depict
complex employer decision making as simpler and sometimes more
nefarious processes. 127
B.

1.

Employment DiscriminationLaw

The Statutes, Theories of Discrimination, and Proof Frameworks

The body of federal employment discrimination law in the United
States is now about fifty-five years old, with most law emanating from
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.128 The doctrine of employment

discrimination law has been developed in a voluminous body of case
law interpreting the lean statutory language of Title VII and the laterenacted laws, with the Supreme Court building a doctrinal core. Three
laws form the principal statutory bases of employment discrimination
law:129 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,130 the Age

125 See, e.g., Figueroa v. Pompeo, 923 F. 3d 1078, 1095 (D.C. Cir. 2019).
126 See Derum & Engle, supra note 119, at 1193 (stating that "we find ourselves in agreement
with Richard Epstein, who has argued that the McDonnellDouglas standard significantly eroded
employment at will by requiring employers to articulate a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason
for their actions").
127 See Fischl, supra note 1, at 183-84.
128 Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000e to 2000e-17). Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was signed into law by President
Lyndon B. Johnson on July 2, 1964, and it became effective July 2, 1965. § 716a, 78 Stat. at 266
(stating that the effective date shall be one year after the date of enactment).
129 Congress enacted the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act in 2008. Genetic
Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-233, 122 Stat. 881 (2008) (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 26, 29, & 42 U.S.C.). The volume of charges filed under the
Act has been small, and there are few reported cases discussing the Act. Regarding number of
charges filed, see Charge Statistics(Charges Filed with EEOC) FY 1997 Through FY 2019, EEOC,
https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/charges.cfm [http://perma.cc/T8H4-TK4A].
130 Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 66 (1964) (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-15). Race discrimination claims also can be asserted under § 1981. 42
U.S.C. § 1981). The analysis of race claims under § 1981 is not separate from or different than
the analysis of such claims under Title VII. See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164,
186 (1989). The Civil Rights Act of 1991 amended Title VII and created a freestanding § 1981a
claim. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 107, 105 Stat. 1071, 1075-76 (1991)
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1981a).
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Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA),131 and the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA).132 The key language of each of the two earliest
laws, Title VII and the ADEA, declares it an "unlawful employment
practice" for an employer "to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any
individual, or otherwise to discriminate against" an employee regarding
terms and conditions of employment "because of... [the protected
characteristic]."133 "Discriminate," which serves as the catchall term to
cover other adverse employment actions, has become the salient term
to identify this area of the law. Title VII and the ADEA do not include
a definition of discrimination.134 At the time of the enactment of Title
VII, discrimination in common parlance135 would have been
understood to mean "distinguish[ing] unjustly."136 The wording of the
ADA prohibition, as amended by the ADA Amendments Act of 2008,
is different, declaring that "[n]o covered entity shall discriminate
against a qualified individual on the basis of disability."137 The ADA,
incorporating the doctrinal developments under the earlier

discrimination laws, then lists seven acts that constitute such
discrimination.138
Given the lean prohibitory language of Title VII and the ADEA,
the courts developed through case law the concepts and principles for
proving and analyzing claims of discrimination. Working from two
statutory subsections in Title VII,139 the Court developed two principal

131 Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602 (1967)
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634).
132 Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (1990) (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12117).
133 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). In a minor variation in language, the ADEA provision states that
"[i]t shall be unlawful for an employer" rather than declaring as Title VII does that "[i]t shall be
an unlawful employment practice." Compare 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) with § 2000e-2(a). In another
inconsequential variation, the ADEA omits the word "to" before "discriminate." § 623(a).
134 Michael Evan Gold, DisparateImpact is Not Unconstitutional, 16 TEx. J. C.L. & C.R. 171,
175 (2011).
135 FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 476 (1994) (stating that "[i]n the absence of... a definition,
we construe a statutory term in accordance with its ordinary or natural meaning").
136 Gold, supra note 134, at 176.
137 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a).
138 Id. § 12112(b).
139 It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, 'or
privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any
way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment
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(intentional

discrimination)140
and
disparate
impact
(unintentional
discrimination).141 Under individual disparate treatment, the Supreme
Court developed two proof structures for proving and analyzing
intentional discrimination: the pretext framework first announced in
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green142and the mixed-motives framework

articulated by the Court in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,143 which was
revised and codified by Congress for Title VII144 in the Civil Rights Act
of 1991.145 This dichotomy of proof structures is of great importance in
employment discrimination law because the overwhelming majority of
claims are individual disparate treatment claims.146 Because the proof
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).
140 The Court also recognized distinctions between individual and systemic disparate
treatment, with a separate proof framework for systemic. Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsters v.
United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
141 The Court has declared that disparate treatment is manifested in Civil Rights Act of 1964,
Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 703(a)(1), 78 Stat. 241, 255 (codified as amended atS 2000e-2(a)(1)), and
disparate impact is embodied in § 703(a)(2), 78 Stat. at 255 (codified as amended atS 2000e2(a)(2)). See Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 235-36 (2005). It is now accepted that the
Court grounded disparate impact in § 703(a)(2) when it recognized the theory in Griggs v. Duke
PowerCo., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). The Court did not expressly state that, however, until its decision
eleven years after Griggs in Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 448 (1982). See Robert Belton, Title
VII at Forty: A Brief Look at the Birth, Death, and Resurrectionof the DisparateImpact Theory of
Discrimination,22 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 431, 454 (2005).
142 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
143 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
144 The Court explained that the mixed-motives framework does not apply under the ADEA
in Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 180 (2009). The Court later held that mixed-motives
is not applicable under the antiretaliation provision of Title VII in Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v.
Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 362 (2013). It probably does not apply under the ADA, but the Supreme
Court has not decided the issue, and there is a circuit split on the issue. See Gentry v. E. W.
Partners Club Mgmt. Co., 816 F.3d 228, 234 (4th Cir. 2016) (joining the Sixth and Seventh
Circuits in applying but-for causation); Lewis v. Humboldt Acquisition Corp., 681 F.3d 312, 321
(6th Cir. 2012) (holding mixed-motives analysis is not applicable to the ADA based on Gross);
Serwatka v. Rockwell Automation, Inc., 591 F.3d 957, 963-64 (7th Cir. 2010) (same). But see
Hoffman v. Baylor Health Care Sys., 597 F. App'x 231, 235 n.12 (5th Cir. 2015) (stating that
standard of causation under the ADA is "motivating factor"), cert. denied, 577 U.S. 818 (2015);
Siring v. Or. State Bd. of Higher Educ., 977 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1063 (D. Or. 2013) (same).
145 Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 107, 105 Stat. 1071, 1075-76 (1991),
(codified at scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). The two parts of the mixed-motives analysis are at
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) ("motivating factor") and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (same-decision
defense).
146 See Donohue & Siegelman, supra note 109, at 988-89 (stating that only 101 of 7,613
employment discrimination claims in 1989 alleged disparate impact); Linda Hamilton Krieger,
Civil Rights Perestroika:IntergroupRelations After Affirmative Action, 86 CALIF. L. REV. 1251,
1302 (1998) ("[B]y the end of the [1980s] the overwhelming majority of Title VII suits involved
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structures are used to analyze claims and decide dispositive motions in
the trial courts, this dichotomy of frameworks has immense practical

significance.147
2.

Weakened by Employment at Will

As discussed above, employment discrimination law necessarily
148
must limit employment at will to some extent. The crucial question is
to what extent employment discrimination law impinges on employer
prerogative to terminate at will. If the employment discrimination laws
are to have any practical significance, they must displace employment
at will to the extent necessary to effectuate the goals of the laws.149 The
Supreme Court has recognized "Title VII's balance between employee
rights and employer prerogatives."150 Progressively over the years, the
Supreme Court and lower courts have pronounced weaker versions of
discrimination doctrine than they otherwise might have out of
solicitude for preserving employer prerogative under employment at

individual claims ofdisparate treatment discrimination brought by individual private litigants.");
Charles A. Sullivan, The Phoenixfrom the Ash: ProvingDiscriminationby Comparators,60 ALA.
L. REv. 191, 198 (2009) [hereinafter Sullivan, The Phoenix] (stating that "the vast majority of
discrimination claims in federal court" are disparate treatment cases). It seems likely that the
predominance ofdisparate treatment claims has increased since the enactment of the Civil Rights
Act of 1991, which made compensatory and punitive damages and jury trials available in
intentional discrimination cases, but not disparate impact cases.
147 I am not addressing in detail the proof frameworks associated with systemic disparate
treatment and disparate impact claims. The Court announced a much less formal and stylized
approach to proving and assessing systemic disparate treatment claims in Int'l Brotherhoodof
Teamsters v. UnitedStates, 431 U.S. 324 (1977). The Court set forth the disparate impact theory
and a rough version of the affiliated proof framework in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424
(1971). Congress revised and codified that framework for Title VII, but not the ADEA and the
ADA, in the Civil Rights Act of 1991. The framework is at 42 U.S.C. 4 2000e-2(k). The Supreme
Court explained that the statutory version of the disparate impact framework does not apply to
the ADEA in Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 232 (2005).
148 See supra Section I.A.3.
149 The most overarching goal is to eradicate employment discrimination based on specified
characteristics. H.R. REP. No. 88-914 (1963), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2391, 2391-94
(stating purpose and reasoning behind Civil Rights Act of 1964); see also McKennon v. Nashville
Banner Publ'g Co., 513 U.S. 352, 357-59 (1995) (noting common purpose of ADEA and Title VII
of eliminating workplace discrimination); Robert Brookins, Hicks, Lies, and Ideology: The Wages
of Sin Is Now Exculpation, 28 CREIGHTON L. REV. 939, 940 n.4 (1995) (citing sources stating goal
of Title VII). At an operational level the Supreme Court breaks that goal down into deterring
discriminatory conduct and making whole the victims of discrimination. See, e.g., Albemarle
Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 416-19 (1975).
150 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 243 (1989).
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will.151 While McDonnell Douglas, announcing the pretext framework,
and Griggs v. Duke PowerCo.,152 adopting the disparate impact analysis,
indicated early in the life of the law that employment discrimination
law might be granted a wide berth in displacing employment at will, the
Supreme Court shifted to more restrictive interpretations of
discrimination law, and it is evident in some ofthe cases that a principal
concern is preservation of employment at will.153

The development of the McDonnellDouglaspretext analysis stands
as both a reminder of the incursion of employment discrimination law
on the at-will principle and a reminder that the courts have guarded

against too much incursion. As noted above, the announcement of the
framework in 1973 declared that employers will be required to give
reasons for terminations (and other adverse actions) when they are
charged with discrimination if plaintiffs are able to establish a prima
facie case of discrimination, which is easily satisfied;154 it would no
longer be acceptable to stand on the "no reason" principle of
employment at will.155 However, the explanation and development of

the stages of the pretext analysis in post-McDonnell Douglas cases
demonstrate the courts' solicitude for preserving a robust at-will
prerogative. The Supreme Court's decision in St. Mary's Honor Center
v. Hicks,156 holding that a plaintiff does not necessarily win judgment as
a matter of law by proving that the employer's proffered legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason is pretextual, has been cited as evidence of
the Court's predilection.157 The Court did reinvigorate the pretext

analysis to some extent in Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products,
Inc.,158 but that decision was necessary only because of some lower
courts' interpretations of St. Mary's Honor Center.
While the holding of St. Mary's Honor Center was about the
procedural significance of a plaintiff proving pretext at stage three of
the analysis, there is another principle embedded in the case that
demonstrates a way in which employment at will constrains
discrimination doctrine. The trial judge in the bench trial stated that he
did not believe the legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons put forward
151 See generallyWilliam R. Corbett, The "Fall"of Summers, the Rise of "PretextPlus,"and the
EscalatingSubordination of Federal Employment DiscriminationLaw to Employment at Will:
Lessonsfrom McKennon and Hicks, 30 GA. L. REV. 305 (1996) [hereinafter Corbett, The "Fall"].
152 Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
153 See, e.g., Corbett, "The Fall,"supra note 151; Derum &Engle, supranote 119, at 1182.
154 See, e.g., St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 515 (1993); Deborah C. Malamud,
The Last Minuet: DisparateTreatment After Hicks, 93 MICH. L. REV. 2229, 2245-50 (1995).
155 See supra notes 123-26 and accompanying text.
156 St. Mary's Honor Ctr., 509 U.S. 502.
157 See, e.g., Derum & Engle, supra note 119, passim.
158 Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc, 530 U.S. 133 (2000).
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by the employer for terminating the plaintiff-that he had severe and

accumulated rules violations.159 However, the judge stated that he
believed the reason was not racial discrimination, but instead was
plaintiff's supervisor's personal animosity toward plaintiff.160 Because
personal animosity is not discriminatory on a basis protected by Title
VII, the judge entered judgment for the defendant. Thus, the court
disbelieved the reasons given by the employer and substituted a

nondiscriminatory reason, not argued for by the employer, that it did
believe. Commentators have argued that this falls in the line of cases
6
adopting a "personal animosity" presumption.1 1 They also explain that
this presumption revives the no-cause or no-reason part ofemployment
at will notwithstanding the requirement at the second part of the pretext
analysis that an employer must prove a legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason for its adverse employment action.162 More precisely, courts
accept that there are situations in which employers do not want to state
and are not required to state the reason for their adverse employment
actions.163 Thus, the pretext analysis becomes a much less useful tool for
plaintiffs because of the interpretation of both the second and third
parts of the framework. Although the Court's decision in St. Mary's
Honor Center is a defensible interpretation of the pretext framework,164
it renders the framework less helpful for discrimination plaintiffs than
it could have been.165
Yet another example of the restrictive influence of employment at
will on discrimination doctrine also relates to interpretation of the
McDonnell Douglas pretext analysis-the "honest belief rule."166 Some
circuit courts subscribe to the view that if an employer produces

sufficient evidence of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason, and the
plaintiff employee establishes that the employer's reason is factually
159 St. Mary's Honor Ctr., 509 U.S. at 507.
160 Id. at 508 (noting the district court concluded that the crusade to terminate plaintiff was
personally rather than racially motivated).
161 Derum & Engle, supranote 119, at 1226.
162 Id. at 1240-41.
163 Id. at 1240.
164 The decision is St. Mary's Honor Center addressed the effect of proving pretext on the
burden of persuasion. The question that plaintiffs ultimately must prove by a preponderance of
the evidence is whether the employer discriminated because of race, or sex, etc. Thus, it is feasible
that a plaintiff could call into doubt the employer's proffered reason without persuading the fact
finder on the ultimate question of discrimination. The effect of proving pretext on the burden of
production, rather than the burden of persuasion, was later addressed by the Court in Reeves v.
Sanderson Plumbing Products.,Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (2000).
165 See, e.g., Calloway, supra note 63, passim.
166 See, e.g., Natasha T. Martin, Pretextin Peril, 75 Mo. L. REV. 313 (2010); Rebecca Michaels,
Note, Legitimate Reasonsfor Firing: Must They Honestly Be Reasonable?, 71 FORDHAM L. REV.
2643 (2003).
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wrong, the plaintiff has not proved discrimination. Although this
approach to the second and third stages of the McDonnell Douglas
analysis again is not unreasonable, it is yet another demonstration of
the courts' resolve to limit the incursion of employment discrimination
law on the employer autonomy embodied in employment at will.167
There are numerous other examples of the Court or courts
rendering restrictive discrimination doctrine out of concern for
preservation of employment at will. In McKennon v. Nashville Banner
Publishing Co.,168 the Court decided that evidence of employee
wrongdoing discovered after a discriminatory discharge could not be
used to avoid liability for discrimination, but it could be used by the
employer to reduce the plaintiff's recovery and to avoid the remedy of
reinstatement. The Court's rationale for permitting an employer to use

after-acquired evidence to limit the remedy for proven discrimination
is the Court's concern for employers' prerogative under employment at
will.169 As with St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, the point here is not

that McKennon was a wrong or bad decision, but it demonstrates a
concern for preserving a significant degree of employer prerogative
regarding termination, even when illegal discrimination is proven.
In a most unusual Supreme Court opinion, the Court evinced a
preoccupation with the incursion ofemployment discrimination law on
employment at will. In University of Texas Southwestern MedicalCenter
v. Nassar,170 the Court addressed the issue of whether but-for causation
is required for proof of retaliation under Title VII. By way of
background, in the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Congress amended Title
VII to expressly include a relaxed or lower171 standard of causation in
Title VII-"motivating factor,"172 taken by Congress from the plurality
opinion in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins.173 In Gross v. FBL Financial

Services, Inc., the Court decided that because Congress did not amend
the ADEA with the "motivating factor" language, the ADEA requires
the higher standard of but-for causation.174 It was not clear, however,

that the Court would extend the Gross reasoning to the anti-retaliation
167 See, e.g., Smith v. Chrysler Corp., 155 F.3d 799, 807 (6th Cir. 1998); Martin, supranote 166,
at 352 (positing that "[t]his rule evolved as a result of courts' efforts to balance the employer's
right to operate with autonomy and the worker's right to be free from discrimination in the
workplace").
168 McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publ'g Co., 513 U.S. 352 (1995).
169 See Corbett, The "Fall,"supra note 151, at 374-75.
170 Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 362 (2013).
171 The Supreme Court has stated that the "motivating factor" standard is a relaxed standard
of causation. EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 575 U.S. 768, 772-73 (2015).
172 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m).
173 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
174 Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc, 557 U.S. 167 (2009).
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provision of Title VII.175 The Court did that in Nassar, and the holding
was a surprise from a couple of perspectives. First, one might have
expected that the Court would have interpreted the anti-retaliation
provision of Title VII consistently with Title VII's anti-discrimination
provision,176 which was amended by the Civil Rights Act of 1991 to
include the "motivating factor" standard. Second, although many
Supreme Court opinions in recent years had not been favorable for civil
rights plaintiffs and advocates, retaliation cases had been a notable
exception.177 The Nassar majority opinion focuses on the statutory
language of the anti-retaliation provision and the 1991 amendment to
demonstrate that Congress intended to include the motivating factor
standard in only the anti-discrimination and not the anti-retaliation
provision.17 8 The Court then explains that recognizing a less stringent
standard of causation for retaliation claims would incentivize the filing
of frivolous claims.179
In a bizarre twist in the opinion, the Court discussed a hypothetical
180
situation, raised by counsel in oral argument of the case, in which an
employee who was about to be fired or suffer other adverse employment
action might file a frivolous discrimination charge and then, when the
adverse action occurred, he would file a retaliation charge.181 The Court
concluded that employers would be put to greater costs in defending
retaliation claims because they would be unlikely to win on summary
judgment if the standard of causation were a motivating factor.182 It is
striking that the hypothetical posed by counsel at oral argument played
a significant part in the rationale of the Court, and many inferences may
flow from this fact. One is that the Court wanted to avoid use of the
anti-retaliation provision to impose liability on employers for what are
really nondiscriminatory terminations but are brought as retaliation

claims.183

175 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).
176 Id. at § 2000e-2(m).
177 See Alex B. Long, RetaliationBacklash, 93 WASH. L. REV. 715, 717 (2018).
178 Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 352-55 (2013).
179 Id. at 358.

180 See, e.g., Michael J. Zimmer, Hiding the Statute in Plain View: University of Texas
Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar, 14 NEV. L.J. 705 (2014); Michael J. Zimmer, Title VII's
Last Hurrah:Can DiscriminationBe PlausiblyPled?, 2014 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 19, 65 n.203 (2014).
181 Nassar, 570 U.S. at 358-59. For a useful discussion of this unusual aspect of the Nassar
opinion, see Sandra F. Sperino & Suja A. Thomas, Fakers and Floodgates,10 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L.
223 (2014).
182 Nassar, 570 U.S. at 358-59.
183 Crucial to this concern is the principle that an employer could retaliate against someone
who could succeed on the retaliation claim, regardless of the merits of the underlying
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As a final example of the courts rendering weak discrimination
doctrine out of concern for preservation of a powerful employment-atwill principle, courts often state some version of the proposition that

federal employment discrimination statutes do not confer on them "the
authority to sit as super-personnel departments reviewing the wisdom
or fairness of the business judgments made by employers, except to the
extent that those judgments involve intentional discrimination."184
While this adage can, and does, apply to any adverse employment
decisions, it seems particularly relevant to terminations, given the
preponderance of discrimination claims that involve terminations.185

This leads to what I consider one of the most restrictive doctrines in
employment discrimination law-comparators. Plaintiff employees
often argue in discrimination cases that even if they did something for
which the employer might discipline them, they were treated differently
than were other employees who engaged in similar conduct. Many
courts have imposed such stringent standards for the similarity of
comparators that they make it virtually impossible for a plaintiff to

identify an acceptable comparator.186
The foregoing are just some of the more salient examples of the
Supreme Court and other courts announcing employment
discrimination doctrine that does not go as far as it might to achieve the
goals of the discrimination laws out of concern for the preservation of
a potent employment-at-will doctrine. Sometimes the courts state this
concern, and sometimes one can see it lurking beneath the
announcement of the restrictive doctrine. If courts were no longer
concerned with employment discrimination law impinging on
employment at will, they would be freer to develop broader and more

efficacious discrimination doctrine.
3.

Deleterious Effects of Employment Discrimination Law's
Functioning as Wrongful Discharge Law

The facts that the preponderance of discrimination claims assert
discriminatory discharge and that there is no general wrongful

discrimination claim, because the employee could have a reasonable belief that discrimination
had occurred. See, e.g., Payne v. McLemore's Wholesale & Retail Stores, 654 F.2d 1130, 1140 (5th
Cir. 1981).
184 Brekke v. City of Blackduck, 984 F. Supp. 1209, 1229-30 (D. Minn. 1997) (quoting Hutson
v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 63 F.3d 771, 781 (8th Cir. 1995)); see also sources cited in Derum
& Engle, supranote 119, at 1238 n.295.
185 See supra notes 109-10 and accompanying text.
186 See, e.g., Lewis v. City of Union City, 918 F.3d 1213 (11th Cir. 2019); see also Sullivan, The
Phoenix, supranote 146, at 213-23 (discussing the courts' standards).
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discharge law make employment discrimination law look like the U.S.
approximation of wrongful discharge law.187 This appearance is
detrimental to the law and harmful to society. Professor Fischl
poignantly identifies some of what he terms the "multiple pathologies"
produced by this interplay of employment at will and employment
discrimination law:188 "unsalutary effects on litigation strategy (the
90
'square peg/round hole' problem),189 on employer EEO practices,1 on
91
judicial understandings of the stakes in discharge cases,1 and on the
availability of reinstatement as an effective remedy for wrongfully
discharged employees."192
I think having employment discrimination law function in this role
can have several deleterious effects on both the law and society. My
concerns are similar, but not identical, to those noted by Professor
Fischl. First, there is a perception that the law makes wrongful discharge
protection available to only "protected classes"-members of groups
against whom there is a history of employment discrimination. Second,
having few other arguably applicable laws providing recourse for
wrongful discharge, discharged employees will pursue their claims
under employment discrimination law, even if the facts suggest a bad

or poor reason for discharge that nonetheless is not discriminatory
under the laws.193 Finally, employers challenged for discriminatory
discharges usually perceive the former employees to be accursing them
ofracism, sexism, or other reprehensible animus, giving rise to stronger

187 See, e.g., Kittner & Kohler, supra note 7, at 279 (quoting Rutherglen, supra note 111, at
504).
188 See Fischl, supranote 1, at 201.
189 By this, Professor Fischl refers to employees who have compelling claims of unfair, but not
discriminatory, discharge bringing those claims as employment discrimination claims because of
the absence of wrongful discharge legal remedies. Fischl, supranote 1, at 181-82.
190 Professor Fischl, citing Professor Cynthia Estlund, notes the incentives created for
employers to discriminate against minorities in hiring, but to "bend over backwards" to avoid
litigation with them once they are employed, thus depriving them ofhonest feedback and careerdevelopment opportunities and engendering resentment among nonminority colleagues. Id. at
183 (citing Estlund, The ChangingWorkplace, supra note 93, at 1678-82).
191 Professor Fischl means that the judicial mindset, steeped in the broad employer
prerogative of at-will employment, is biased against believing discharges are discriminatory, and
this interaction between legal tenets has spawned the employment discrimination proof
frameworks that poorly replicate the employer's decision-making process. Id. at 183-84.
192 Professor Fischl argues that an employee reinstated without the just cause protection of a
collective bargaining agreement is in a particularly precarious position because, if an adverse
action is taken and she sues, she will have the burden of establishing a retaliatory motive rather
than a simply unfair action. Id. at 201.
193 See, e.g., Jeffrey M. Hirsch, The Law of Termination:DoingMore with Less, 68 MD. L. REV.
89, 143 (2008) (observing that "employees .. . may file discrimination claims even though no.
discrimination actually occurred).
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emotional reactions than might otherwise be warranted to allegations
of a discharge that is unsupported by job-related reasons.
There is a misperception that because the employment
discrimination laws have become the most significant wrongful
discharge laws in the United States, employees who are members of
"protected classes" are not subject to employment at will.194 That is, the
perception is that employers will incur liability if they terminate
employees who are members of historically discriminated against
groups without documented job-related reasons. This misperception
likely is fed by the goal of the discrimination laws to open employment
opportunities for members of groups against whom there is a history of
discrimination. Consider, for example, that the Supreme Court, in
stating the elements of the prima facie case of the pretext framework in
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, stated that the first element of the
prima facie case is that the claimant must prove that "he belongs to a
racial minority."195 The Court would later explain in McDonaldv. Santa
Fe Trail Transportation Co.,196 a reverse discrimination case, the
reference to "racial minority" in McDonnell Douglas: "Requirement (i)
of this sample pattern of proof was set out only to demonstrate how the
racial character of the discrimination could be established in the most

common sort of case, and not as an indication of any substantive
limitation of Title VII's prohibition of racial discrimination."197
Everyone who is knowledgeable about employment discrimination law
understands that Caucasians, men, and members of other groups that
historically were not commonly victims of employment discrimination
are covered by Title VII.198 Yet, the Court's somewhat clumsy statement
in McDonnell Douglas evinces both an understanding of the principal
purpose of Title VII and what is a fairly common misperception that
the laws cover only those who are members ofhistorically discriminated
against groups.
Beyond the misperception about coverage of the discrimination
laws, it is true that the discrimination laws do not uniformly cover
Caucasians and men equally or in exactly the same way as they cover
members of historically discriminated against groups. As is well known,

the McDonnell Douglas prima facie case is very easily satisfied199 and

194 See infranotes 207-11 and accompanying teXt.

195 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
196 McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976).
197 Id. at 279 n.6.
198 Curiously, the Court declined to find reverse discrimination claims actionable under the
ADEA. Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581 (2004).
199 See, e.g., St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506 (1993) (referring to the "minimal
requirements" of the prima facie case).
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creates a rebuttable presumption of discrimination. However, some
courts, recognizing that the assumptions on which the prima facie case
is based are not equally valid when the plaintiff is not a member of a
group that has been historically discriminated against, have imposed an
additional requirement in reverse discrimination cases that the plaintiff
must prove something additional to establish a prima facie case"background circumstances" showing that the employer at issue is one

which would be likely to engage in this historically uncommon type of
discrimination.200 However, other courts object to imposing the
201
additional requirement in the prima facie case, reasoning that to do
so would violate an important theoretical foundation of employment
2
discrimination law-equal treatment of similarly situated persons. 02
The different treatment is not limited to the pretext framework used to

analyze individual disparate treatment claims. An appellate court
rejected a disparate impact claim of a tall, male plaintiff in Livingston v.
Roadway Express.203 It appeared in the case that a tall man presented
sufficient evidence to demonstrate that a height maximum imposed as
a condition of employment by a trucking company disproportionately
screened out men, but the court rejected the claim. The court stated that
no disparity was manifested in the employer's workforce and that the
204
The
plaintiff had not established background circumstances.
I
am
which
of
decision
other
no
is
there
that
rationale is surprising in
aware that suggests that the background circumstances requirement
205
applies to disparate impact cases.
200 See, e.g., Duffy v. Wolle, 123 F.3d 1026, 1036 (8th Cir. 1997) (noting that being a minority
is enough to suggest discrimination, but being a historically non-discriminated-against person
requires more); Parker v. Balt. & Ohio R.R., 652 F.2d 1012, 1017 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (finding that it
makes no sense in contemporary society to infer majority discrimination in the same manner as
minority discrimination). See generally Angela Onwuachi-Willig, When Different Means the
Same: Applying a Different Standardof Proofto White Plaintiffs Under the McDonnell Douglas
PrimaFacie Case Test, 50 CASE W. RSRV. L. REV. 53 (1999) (advocating for a modified first prong
of the prima facie case for white plaintiffs).
201 See, e.g., Iadimarco v. Runyon, 190 F.3d 151, 161 (3d Cir. 1999) (rejecting the background
circumstances factor because all that is required is a showing that "the employer is treating some
people less favorably than others based upon a trait that is protected under Title VII"); Lind v.
City of Battle Creek, 681 N.W.2d 334, 335 (Mich. 2004) (overruling a prior decision that used the
background circumstances requirement because it clearly conflicted with the state's civil rights
laws).
202 See, e.g., Clements v. Barden Miss. Gaming, LLC, 373 F. Supp. 2d 653, 667-68 (N.D. Miss.
2004) (calling the background circumstances requirement "illogical and even dangerous"); Lind,
681 N.W.2d at 335 (stating that "'individual' means 'individual"').
203 Livingston v. Roadway Express, Inc., 802 F.2d 1250 (10th Cir. 1986).

204 Id. at 1252-53.

205 The Livingston case also hints at a more dramatic difference in treatment: perhaps the
disparate impact theory should not even be available in reverse discrimination cases. See, e.g.,
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As discussed above, a majority of employment discrimination
claims now include termination claims.206 Given both the realities of
law, such as background circumstances, and some misperceptions

regarding who is covered by the discrimination laws, discord can be
sown in society when the discrimination statutes become the principal
wrongful discharge laws. For example, Professor Stephen Befort posits
that "[m]any white men perceive Title VII as establishing special

protective rules for women and minorities."207 Many commentators
have noted the backlash against discrimination laws prompted by those
who were not historically discriminated against, believing that special
rules protect others.208 Professor Estlund described the effect this way:
However ineffectual existing remedies for discrimination may be for
most employees, their availability to some may foster resentment by
others. Employees who are not "protected" by those laws may
perceive fairness itself as a special privilege from which they are
excluded. The claim of "reverse discrimination" is a tempting
response that mirrors the victim-orientation of wrongful discharge
law and aggravates the dynamic of fragmentation and
polarization.209
Thus, scholars have noted the concern that white and male at-will
employees may see the discrimination statutes as bestowing special
protections regarding the vitally important issue of job security on
African American and female employees. Professor McGinley
speculated that this backlash could influence judges to interpret the
discrimination statutes restrictively.210 Although the perception of
special protection of "protected classes" regarding any employment
actions could be polarizing and divisive, it seems that this sentiment
must be exacerbated when the employment action at issue is
termination-the "capital punishment"211 of employment actions.

Charles A. Sullivan, The World Turned Upside Down?: DisparateImpact Claims by White Males,
98 Nw. U. L. REv. 1505 (2004). No court has held that disparate impact is so limited, and none is
likely to do so, as doing so would render the disparate impact theory constitutionally infirm. Id.
at 1512 (positing that such an interpretation could not survive an equal protection challenge).
206 See supra notes 109-11.
207 Befort, Millennium, supra note 47, at 409.
208 See id.; Ann C. McGinley, Rethinking Civil Rights and Employment at Will: Toward a
Coherent National DischargePolicy, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 1443, 1489-91 (1996); Hirsch, supra note
193, at 106-07, 140.
209 Estlund, The ChangingWorkplace, supra note 93, at 1681.
210 See McGinley, supra note 208, at 1490.
211 See, e.g., Cynthia E. Nance, Why Labor and Employment Ethics?,33 N. KY. L. REV. 201, 201
(2006) (citing Dick Grote, Public Sector Organizations: Today's Innovative Leaders in
PerformanceManagement, PUB. PERS. MGMT., Spring 2000, at 13.
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If a backlash effect based on inaccurate understanding of
employment discrimination law has been a concern over the years, how
much more pronounced might that concern have become by 2020?

Blatantly divisive rhetoric and mischaracterization of many matters
regarding discrimination have become commonplace in recent years in
an increasingly polarized212 society in the United States.
Discharged employees looking for a vehicle to assert their claims
for "wrongful" or "unfair" discharge often assert their claims under the
employment discrimination laws.213 If that is so, it seems likely that a
not insignificant number of cases are cases of discharges without jobrelated reasons masquerading as discrimination claims. This
phenomenon likely plays a role in the perception that a large percentage
of employment discrimination claims are without merit and perhaps
frivolous.214 Indeed, the Supreme Court's hypothetical in its decision in

Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar215 evinces this concern-

,

employees who are about to be fired will file meritless discrimination
claims followed by retaliation claims to provide them a means of legal
recourse. Discharged employees assert unfair discharge claims as
discrimination claims, courts become more skeptical of discrimination
claims, and this skepticism results in the courts rendering weaker-thanneeded discrimination law. The most obvious example of this is
probably the Court's interpretation of the pretext prong of the

McDonnell Douglas analysis in St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks.216
212 See, e.g., Political Polarization in the American Public: How Increasing Ideological
Uniformity and PartisanAntipathy Affect Politics, Compromise and Everyday Life, PEW RSCH.
CTR. (June 12, 2014), https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2014/06/12/political-polarizationin-the-american-public [https://perma.cc/72NN-WMH9].
It is worth noting that the preceding study was published in 2014. It seems likely that
polarization has increased since that time. See, e.g., John Gramlich, 20 Striking Findings From
2
2
2020, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Dec. 11, 2020), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/1 /11/ 0findings
the
twenty
of
(several
striking-findings-from-2020 [https://perma.cc/VJQ2-MA5L}
highlight the increasing polarization in the United States).
213 See, e.g., Hirsch, supranote 193, at 142.
214 Fischl, supra note 1, at 183-84; Hirsch, supra note 193, at 142 ("This search for an
explanation results in unmeritorious claims that give employees false hope, impose unnecessary
litigation costs on employers, waste judicial resources, and often overshadow valid
discrimination claims by making judges suspicious of all such cases."); cf Lee Reeves, Pragmatism
Over Politics: Recent Trends in Lower CourtEmployment DiscriminationJurisprudence, 73 Mo.
L. REV. 481, 556 (2008) ("[T]he consistently high volume of employment discrimination claims
has outstripped even the most aggressive estimates of employment discrimination that remains.
Under any analysis, it necessarily follows that a considerable number of employment
discrimination claims are meritless, if not frivolous.").
215 Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 354 (2013). See discussion supra
notes170-83.
216 St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993); see discussion supra notes 156-65 and
accompanying text.
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Although St. Mary's Honor Center is a defensible interpretation of the
pretext prong and one with which I agree, one also can see in it a waning

acceptance of a "basic assumption," as Professor Calloway expressed it,
on which the framework was built.217 The frameworks for individual
disparate treatment theory218 and systemic discrimination theory219 are
built on assumptions about the likelihood and prevalence of
employment discrimination. When these assumptions are less accepted
by courts, the employment discrimination doctrine they fashion will

become less robust.
Furthermore, the role of the employment discrimination laws as
the most efficacious wrongful discharge law available220 creates greater
animosity between former employers and former employees in
litigation of discharge cases than would seem warranted.221 Most
attorneys who have practiced labor and employment law are familiar
with the heightened emotion with which some employers approach
claims by former employees. Employers seem to feel a sense of
ingratitude and betrayal that someone to whom they provided a job
would contest and seek to hold them liable for a termination decision.222
217 See Calloway, supra note 63.
218 The McDonnell Douglas pretext framework begins with the prima facie case, which rests
upon the assumption that if the two most common reasons for adverse employment actions, lack
of a vacancy and lack of qualifications, are eliminated as explanations, then discrimination is a
likely explanation for the decision. As the Court explained:
A prima facie case under McDonnellDouglasraises an inference of discrimination only
because we presume these acts, if otherwise unexplained, are more likely than not
based on the consideration of impermissible factors. And we are willing to presume
this largely because we know from our experience that more often than not people do
not act in a totally arbitrary manner, without any underlying reasons, especially in a
business setting. Thus, when all legitimate reasons for rejecting an applicant have been
eliminated as possible reasons for the employer's actions, it is more likely than not the
employer, who we generally assume acts only with some reason, based his decision on
an impermissible consideration such as race.
Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978) (emphasis in original) (internal citation
omitted); see also Calloway, supra note 63.
219 See, e.g., Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 339 n.20 (1977)
("Statistics showing racial or ethnic imbalance are probative in a case such as this one only
because such imbalance is often a telltale sign of purposeful discrimination; absent explanation,
it is ordinarily to be expected that nondiscriminatory hiring practices will in time result in a work
force more or less representative of the racial and ethnic composition of the population in the
community from which employees are hired.").
220 See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
221 See, e.g., Fischl, supra note 1, at 182.
222 In my personal experience, I shall never forget the president of a company that I
represented in a lawsuit by a terminated employee. The former employee sued under several
theories, including breach of contract and age and race discrimination. The case probably could
have been settled for a relatively modest sum. When we met with the president, however, he told
us to crush the former employee, no matter how much it cost.
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The emotional response can be exacerbated exponentially when the
former employee seemingly accuses the employer of being a racist, a
sexist, or an ageist. Although the employment discrimination statutes

cover discrimination that is not animus-based and not so morally
reprehensible, such as discrimination based on stereotypes and
disparate impact, employers often perceive that they are being accused
22 3
of virulent hate based on race, sex, age, etc.
The negative effects of this unhealthy symbiosis between
employment at will and employment discrimination law could be
ameliorated by providing for general wrongful discharge laws and
taking termination claims out of the coverage of the discrimination
laws. However, individual states will not do it, and Congress will not
impose it on them. We have to break out of that dichotomy to find a
solution. An unexplored way out of this dilemma may be embedded in
the relationship between states' employment-at-will law and federal
employment discrimination law and the ability of Congress to work
with the states.
C.

The Way Forward:A Big Trade

The twin pillars of U.S. employment law have put us in an
interesting position. Employment at will, notwithstanding its iconic
status, does not have great practical value to employers. It would seem
to be a divine prerogative of inestimable value, but that is seen as
illusion when viewed in light of the employment discrimination laws
and the many other exceptions under federal and state laws. As
Professors Kittner and Kohler aptly characterize it, U.S. employers
already are functioning as though they are regulated in terminations by
a wrongful discharge law.224 On the other hand, the employment
discrimination laws are burdened with their role of being the most
significant exception to employment at will, and courts, solicitous of
protecting the seemingly important "divine right" of employers,
develop employment discrimination doctrine that is more restrictive
than what is needed to address the persistent problem of invidious
employment discrimination.

Kittner and Kohler speculate that "[i]f the United States had a
system requiring

fundamental

justification of a termination

in

accordance with a good cause concept, discrimination rulings in
223 See, e.g., Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias
Approach to Discriminationand Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REv. 1161, 1163
(1995) (describing an unpleasant interview with a manger who fumed at "being called a bigot").
224 Kittner & Kohler, supranote 7, at 327.
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relation to termination
[claims] would lose their practical
significance."225 They base this supposition on the employment law of
Germany. Because Germany has a federal discharge statute and
employment discrimination laws, the issue of discrimination rarely
plays any role in unfair dismissal claims.226 These thoughts suggest to
me a way for the United States to improve its termination law and
employment discrimination law and thus the nation's overall
employment law and society's view of that law-a trade of sorts. I
propose that employment at will be replaced with state wrongful
discharge laws and termination claims be removed from the realm of
federal employment discrimination law.
Employers actually would not lose a right that is as valuable as it is
perceived to be because under current law they rarely feel free to
function as though employment at will is the law.227 Wrongful discharge
laws would put them in the position of defending that they have good
or just cause (job-related reasons) for firing employees-something
most employers already are prepared to do. They would not be accused

of being discriminators, however, which most understand to be
accusations of bigotry, misogyny, or other reprehensible animus.228
Victims of discriminatory terminations would still have legal recourse,

but it would not come under the employment discrimination laws.
How can this be done? Congress enacted the employment
discrimination laws, and it can amend those laws. Similarly, state
legislatures have the authority to enact state wrongful discharge statutes
that displace employment at will, as the Montana legislature did decades
ago. Congress must be willing to exempt termination claims from
coverage under federal discrimination law in exchange for states
enacting wrongful discharge laws.

II.

A.

A COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM APPROACH TO WRONGFUL
DISCHARGE LAW

CooperativeFederalismRather Than FederalWrongful Discharge
Law

How could the exchange that I propose be implemented? Congress
is not going to enact a federal wrongful discharge law that displaces state

225

Id. at 330.

226 Id. at 315.

227 See supranotes 108-118 and accompanying text.
228 See supranotes 221-23.
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discharge law. A single, federal statute governing termination, which
would preempt any state law regarding termination, has obvious
advantages, including clarity and simplicity,229 and such is the approach
of other nations. Cogent arguments have been made for such a federal
law in the United States.230 I agree that it is the best solution, but it will
not happen. While possible in terms of Congressional power, politically,
it is not feasible in this nation.
For over a century and a half,231 states have regulated employment
termination through state law, subject to congressionally mandated
exceptions. When a compelling public policy case can be made for an
exception, such as the federal employment discrimination laws or the
various anti-retaliation provisions in federal employment laws,
Congress is responsive and up to the task. While the exceptions have
proliferated, it is one thing for the federal government to impose
exceptions on the states and quite another to displace state law
altogether on a matter as fundamental as employer prerogative
regarding employee-discharge. The cavalcade of federal exceptions to
employment at will has not moved Congress to displace the basic state
law on employment termination. Although one may argue that the
political winds shifted with the 2020 presidential election, no such
federal legislation was even a serious consideration under recent
Democratic presidents.232 The historical record evinces Congress's
unwillingness to arrogate to the federal government general regulation

229 See, e.g., Hirsch, supra note. 193, at 91.
230 See, e.g., id. passim; Befort, Millennium, supra note 47, at 424; McGinley, supra note 208.
231 Employment termination law did not become a significant legal issue until roughly the
mid-1800s. See Morriss, supra note 70, at 681-82 (discussing the chronology of states' adoption
of employment at will).
232 Neither President Clinton nor President Obama and the Congresses during their terms
took any such action, and the employment laws they enacted could not be characterized as
revolutionary or transformative. On the general reluctance of Congress to substantially change
U.S. employment law no matter who is in power, see generally William R. Corbett, "The More
Things Change, .. .": Reflections on the Stasis of Labor Law in the United States, 56 VILL. L. REv.
227 (2011). Although Congress does not radically change U.S. employment law when political
power shifts, federal agencies do. The National Labor Relations Board often reverses a large
number of Board precedents when there is a change in the presidency. For example, the Board,
with the substantial influence of the General Counsel, during the Trump Administration reversed
an unusually large number of precedents. See, e.g., Robert Iafolla, Top Trump Labor Lawyer
Extends Campaign to Remake Workplace Law, BLOOMBERG L.: DAILY LAB. REP. (June 5, 2019,
6:05 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/daily-labor-report/top-trump-labor-lawyer-extendscampaign-to-remake-workplace-law [https://perma.cc/ST45-GM4V]. However, federal agencies
cannot, of course, enact federal legislation.
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of termination,233 and I perceive nothing that suggests an impending
change.234

I suggest that we not try to persuade Congress to do what it has not
done and will not do. Instead, I propose an approach of cooperative
federalism. Although full exposition of that topic is beyond the scope of
this Article, I mean by that term an approach in which Congress
achieves an objective of the federal government by inducing or inviting

the states to act consistent with that objective.235 Although displacing
employment at will has not clearly been an objective of the federal
government, I have argued that it should be in order to improve both
the employment law of the nation and our society generally.
Cooperative federalism has been employed in many areas of law,
such as environmental and natural resource law, education, welfare,
and crime control.236 The Affordable Care Act237 has elements of
cooperative federalism, such as the state-run healthcare exchanges
subject to federal standards.238 Perhaps most relevant to the proposal
described herein is the unemployment insurance joint project of the
federal and state governments from the New Deal era.239 Briefly
rendered, the federal government made tax credits for the federal
unemployment tax available to employers in states that developed
233 Consider, for example, the struggle to enact Title VII and the forces that had to converge
to make that monumental change come to fruition. See, e.g., Sheryll D. Cashin, Shall We
Overcome? TranscendingRace, Class, and Ideology Through Interest Convergence, 79 ST. JOHN'S
L. REV. 253 (2005).
234 Indeed, Professor Hirsch, who set forth an impressive proposal of a federal termination
law, concluded his article by noting that "it is unlikely that a proposal this ambitious would ever
be fully adopted." Hirsch, supra note 193, at 158.
235 See, e.g., Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 289 (1981);
Robert L. Fischman, CooperativeFederalism and NaturalResources Law, 14 N.Y.U. ENV'T. L.J.
179, 180 (2005); Michael S. Greve, Against Cooperative Federalism,70 MISS. L.J. 557, 558 (2000);
Erwin Chemerinsky, Jolene Forman, Allen Hopper, & Sam Kamin, Cooperative Federalismand
MarijuanaRegulation, 62 UCLA L. REV. 74, 116 (2015) (describing cooperative federalism as "a
partnership between the States and the Federal Government, animated by a shared objective")
(quoting Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91, 101 (1992)). Professor Philip Weiser characterizes
cooperative federalism as "a middle ground solution between the extremes of dual federalism
and preemptive federalism." Philip J. Weiser, Towards a Constitutional Architecture for
Cooperative Federalism,79 N.C. L. REV. 663, 666 (2001).
236 See, e.g., Greve, supra note 235, at 558.
237 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010)
(codified in scattered sections of titles 5, 18, 20, 21, 25, 26, 28-31, 35, 36, and 42 of the U.S.C.).
238 See, e.g., Chemerinsky et al., supra note 235, at 118; Heather K. Gerken, The Federalis(m)
Society, 36 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 941, 942 (2013); Saby Ghoshray, BrandeisianExperiment
Meets FederalPreemption:Is CooperativeFederalisma Panaceafor MarijuanaRegulation?,35 N.
ILL. U. L. REV. 511, 529 (2015);
Sarah E. Light, Advisory Nonpreemption, 95 WASH. U. L. REV. 325, 340-41 (2017).
239 See Weiser, supra note 235, at 669 (citing unemployment insurance and other New Deal
programs that called for state implementation of federal programs).
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programs that conformed with federal

unemployment insurance

standards.240
The cooperative federalism approach seems well-suited to a
federally brokered trade-off between state employment at will and
federal employment discrimination law, in light of the problems created
by the interplay between these two pillars of U.S. employment law and

the respective spheres of regulation of Congress and the state
legislatures.
I do not favor a hard or coercive version of federalism in which
states are denied funds unless they accede to and administer federal
standards.241 Instead, I propose that Congress enact legislation that
gives states the option of having employment termination claims
removed from coverage under the employment discrimination statutes
if a state enacts an acceptable wrongful discharge statute requiring good
or just (job or business related) cause for termination.
The Uniform Law Commission has made it a priority to encourage
cooperative federalism approaches in various contexts to accomplish
the twin goals of implementing needed laws and maintaining the
healthy balance between federal and state authority.242 Significantly, the
Commission also promulgated the META.243 However, no state enacted
a version of the META because it did not garner support of employers
or gain significant political leverage to cause states to act. Under a
cooperative federalism approach, perhaps employers and/or other
interest groups would spur states to act.
B.

The Proposal

Under this proposal, Congress would pass legislation that would

permit states to opt out of the coverage of discharge claims244 by the
federal employment discrimination laws if they enact state wrongful

240 See, e.g., Lester, supra note 57, at 340.
241 See, e.g., Patricia E. Salkin, The Quiet Revolution and Federalism:Into the Future, 45 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 253, 261-62 (2012); Adam Babich, The Supremacy Clause, Cooperative
Federalism,and the Full FederalRegulatoryPurpose, 64 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 24 (2012).
242 See, e.g., David C. McBride & Raymond P. Pepe, Federalism,Liberty and Preemption:The
PatientProtectionand Affordable CareAct, 29 DEL. LAW. 22, 26-27 (2012); William H. Henning,
The Uniform Law Commission and Cooperative Federalism:Implementing Private International
Law Conventions Through Uniform State Laws, 2 ELON L. REv. 39, 44-45 (2011).
243 See infra notes 252-54 and accompanying text.
244 I propose that all discharge claims be removed from coverage of the employment
discrimination statutes, including retaliation claims and constructive discharge claims, and
placed under state wrongful discharge laws. The EEOC would retain jurisdiction over all types of
adverse employment actions other than terminations.
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discharge laws that abrogate employment at will and meet minimum
federal standards. I do not undertake in this Article to work out all the
details of what the minimum federal standards should be.245 My
principal purpose is to initiate a discussion about a different type of
approach, based on cooperative federalism, to displacing employment
at will and removing that significant impediment to the courts'
development of more robust employment discrimination law doctrine.
If my proposal were to gain traction, there would be time enough to

develop the details of the required federal minimum standards.
Moreover, there have been numerous proposals246 and some existing
laws247 that offer models from which to craft an acceptable statute. 248
I will, however, take a "first stab" at some basics that emanate from
the trade-off that I propose. A qualifying state statute should have a
number of required elements and, beyond those, some flexibility for

245 Sadly, I am not so naive as to believe that soon after publication of this Article Congress
will adopt my proposal, although I think it should. See, e.g., Hirsch, supra note 193, at 158-59.
Professor Hirsch acknowledges that his proposal for a single federal termination law likely is too
ambitious to be fully adopted, but he argues that such an ambitious proposal could prompt
"limited pragmatic reforms" that would be positive steps in the development of the law. Id.
Assuming the approach I propose gains traction in Congress, the minimum requirements of an
acceptable termination law could be debated and determined based on a substantial body of
scholarship.
246 See supra Section I.A.2.
247 Montana, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands have such laws. See supra notes 71-72
and accompanying text. Almost all other nations have wrongful discharge laws. International
Labour Organization [ILO] Convention No. 158 and Recommendation No. 166 provide a useful
model approved by an international organization. See Int'l Lab. Org. [ILO], Termination of
Employment Convention, C158 (June 2, 1982), https://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/
f?p=NORMLEXPUB:12100:0::NO::P12100_ILO_CODE:C158 [https://perma.cc/6VYZ-WNZ7];
Int'l Lab. Org. [ILO], Termination of Employment Recommendation, R166 (June 2, 1982),
https://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/fp=NORMLEXPUB:12100:0::NO::P12100_ILO_
CODE:R166 [https://perma.cc/X86C-WTJC].
248 One matter that is frequently discussed is how to define "good cause" or "just cause." This
simply is not a difficult issue. The ILO Convention and Recommendation, the META and
Montana Act, and the laws of most nations in the world provide suitable definitions. See sources
cited supra note 23. Moreover, we have a substantial body of arbitral decisions defining good
cause in the context of employees entitled to good cause protection under collective bargaining
agreements. See supranote 23. It will suffice here to say that the types of reasons that qualify as
good cause are "personal" reasons, meaning related to the work performance or conduct of the
worker, and "business" reasons, meaning based on the operational requirements of the
undertaking, establishment, or service. See, e.g., Int'l Lab. Org. [ILO], Termination of
Employment Convention, C158 art. 4 (June 2, 1982), https://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=
NORMLEXPUB:12100:0:: NO::P12100_ILO_CODE:C158 [https://perma.cc/6VYZ-WNZ7].
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state variations.249 I do not think complete uniformity should be the goal
so long as certain minimum protections are required.250
Two overarching considerations must be taken into account

regarding specification of the minimum requirements. First, terminated
employees would not be able to pursue termination claims under the
federal employment discrimination laws, so an acceptable wrongful
discharge law should have remedies, procedures, and a forum for
adjudicating claims that are comparable to what exists now under the

federal discrimination laws. Second, in order for states to be interested
in opting to enact wrongful discharge laws, it seems likely that employer
support would be needed, or at least employer opposition would need

to be minimized. To achieve either support or suppression of
opposition, employers would need to believe that they were receiving
some advantages in the trade. Professor Befort posited that the META
was not enacted by any state because it did not provide adequate tradeoffs for the loss of employment at will.25I Developing an approved

statute that balances those two objectives is no easy task.
The META provides a useful starting point. It was promulgated by

the Uniform Law Commission a few years after the Montana Act was
enacted, so the Commission promulgated the META with the Montana

law as background. Furthermore, the META has been extensively
critiqued.22 The META thus provides a useful starting point, but
because no state enacted a version of the META, the second overarching
consideration needs to be addressed-adequate trade-offs for
employers. Professor Befort made several points about the inadequate
trade-offs provided to employers. One of those points in particular
merits consideration in my proposal. He pointed out that the META
would have added claims against employers rather than supplanting
any claims.253 He recommended that the discharge law should displace
all termination claims except those arising under a collective bargaining
249 The Uniform Law Commission, for example, promulgates both uniform and model acts.
Model acts are promulgated when uniformity may be a desirable objective, but it is not the
principal objective. See What is a Model Act?, UNIF. L. COMM'N, https://www.uniformlaws.org/
acts/overview/modelacts [https://perma.cc/5Q2D-ZEB2]. Notably, the Commission developed a
model, not uniform, act for termination. See MODEL EMP. TERMINATION ACT (UNIF. LAW
COMM'N 1991).
250 Professor Hirsch argues for adoption of a federal termination law because "[i]t is virtually
impossible to get all states to implement the same termination rules." Hirsch, supra note 193, at
99.
251 See Befort, Millennium, supra note 47, at 427.
252 Professor St. Antoine served as the reporter or principal draftsperson of the META. He
provides a useful overview of the META in Theodore J. St. Antoine, The Making of the Model
Employment TerminationAct, 69 WASH. L. REv. 361 (1994) [hereinafter St. Antoine, The Making
of the Model].
253 Befort, Millennium, supra note 47, at 428.
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agreement. 254 Under my proposal, the federally approved state wrongful
discharge law would supersede only termination claims under the
federal employment discrimination laws. There is a point regarding the

discrimination laws on which Professor Befort and I disagree.
Recognizing the important public policy undergirding the federal
employment discrimination laws, Professor Befort felt some discomfort
with displacing the claims under the discrimination laws and sought to
assuage that concern by recommending that the adjudicators be vested
with the authority to award double or treble damage awards to preserve
the deterrent functions of the discrimination laws.255 Although I, too,
understand and support the importance of deterring and punishing

discrimination,

I

do not

subscribe

to

enhanced-damages-for-

discrimination as part of the discharge law remedies because it would
maintain the incentive to pursue discrimination claims and litigate the
issue of discrimination. I have discussed why I think this is harmful to
both discrimination law and society.256 On this point, Professor Hirsch
and I agree that a termination law must displace termination claims
under the federal discrimination laws.257 Moreover, the core of the
trade-off that I propose is the elimination of termination claims under
the employment discrimination laws, and the enhanced damages
largely would eviscerate the benefit to employers in that trade-off. Thus,
for those reasons I would not favor enhanced damages for proof of

discriminatory dismissal.
Professor Befort's second point about the inadequacy of trade-off
under the META is that the remedies are too generous to employees,
exceeding those available under the laws of most other nations.258 He
recommended several downward adjustments of the remedies:
generally deleting reinstatement (unless it served the public policy of
eliminating discrimination); capping front pay awards at a maximum
of one year's pay; and reducing the cost of a waiver in the form of
guaranteed severance pay.259 The last adjustment requires further
explanation. The META provides that employers and employees may
by express written agreement waive the good-cause requirement for
termination if the employer agrees to severance pay of at least one
month's pay for each year of service up to a maximum of thirty months'

254 Id.

Id. at 430.
256 See supraSection I.B.3.
257 See Hirsch, supra note 193, at 106 (arguing that, under Befort's proposal, "[a]lthough
employees would no longer be able to bring claims under a specific antidiscrimination statute,
they would be able to make the same arguments").
258 Befort, Millennium, supranote 47, at 431.
259 Id.
255
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pay. 260 The issue of the remedies available under a federally approved
statute is critical to my proposal because one of my overarching
considerations is that the approved law must offer remedies roughly
comparable to the federal employment discrimination laws that it is
displacing with respect to termination claims. A beginning point thus
would seem to be the remedies available under the discrimination
laws:261 backpay, injunctive relief, including possible reinstatement, and
capped compensatory and punitive damages,262 as under Title VII and
the ADA,263 although the caps of Section 1981(a) do not apply to race
discrimination claims under Section 1981.264 Punitive damages could be
limited, as under the discrimination laws, to claims that satisfy a
standard such as "with malice or with reckless indifference to the
federally protected rights of an aggrieved individual"265 to the right to
be discharged only for good cause. Although I think this proposal must
begin with the remedies available under Title VII and the ADA because
those are the rights and claims being displaced, the problem is that
making the remedies available under the discrimination laws available
to all wrongfully discharged employees does not offer an attractive
trade-off to employers, thus, replicating the problem Professor Befort
noted with the META. However, the META's agreed-upon-waiver-fora-severance-package may provide an interesting provision that would
make the legislation more attractive to employers. The META
contemplates such agreed-upon waivers being negotiated at the
beginning of the employment relationship rather than at the time of
termination. Thus, by mutual agreement, an employer and employee
opt out of the good-cause regime in exchange for a guaranteed
severance package. Many employers today at the time of termination
seek to obtain waivers in exchange for a lump sum payment. Thus, the
META buyout is like current practice, except in timing. Although many
would object to employers being able to opt out of employment
discrimination claims at the beginning of the employment relationship,

260 MODEL EMP. TERMINATION ACT § 4(c) (UNIF. L. COMM'N 1991).

261 The remedies available under the ADEA are different from those available underTitle VII
and the ADA. The ADEA incorporates the remedies under the Fair Labor Standards Act:
"[a]mounts owing to a person as a result of a violation of this Act shall be deemed to be unpaid
minimum wages or unpaid overtime compensation," but liquidated damages are due only upon
proof by the plaintiff of a willful violation. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b).
262 Although the META expressly excluded compensatory and punitive damages, MODEL
EMP. TERMINATION ACT § 7(d), the META did not displace rights or claims under the
discrimination laws. MODEL EMP. TERMINATION ACT § 2(e).
263 The remedies under the ADEA are different, as the ADEA incorporates the remedial
provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act. 29 U.S.C. § 626.
264 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
265 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981a-1981(b)(1).
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it is important to remember that the issue is not opting out of
employment discrimination law,266 as only termination claims would be
affected by this proposal, with all other adverse employment actions
remaining covered. What the employer and employee would be opting
out of is only good cause protection against termination. Still, I think
the better practice is to require state laws that do not permit the
employer to insulate itself at the beginning of the relationship through
a waiver, but instead make the option available at the point of
termination when both parties can assess the strength of the employer's
good-cause case, which is what is done, with substantial procedural
protections for the employee under the Older Workers Benefit
Protection Act (OWBPA).267 Although the OWBPA is not roundly
applauded, as it does represent a compromise on the prohibition against

discrimination,268 the use of waivers at the time of termination could be
a compromise that would make this tradeoff work. Even
antidiscrimination goals maybe compromised in pursuit of other social
goals.269 The compromise may be worthwhile to achieve the abrogation
of employment at will and the liberation of the employment
discrimination laws from the baggage of termination claims.
An existing statute that provides for a different set of remedies than
the META or the Montana Act is Puerto Rico's Act No. 80 or Wrongful
Discharge Act.270 As one commentator has noted, few scholars who
propose enactment of wrongful discharge law in the United States
examine Puerto Rico's law in much depth.271 Puerto Rico's Act No. 80
establishes a remedial scheme of indemnities based on length of service
if the employer cannot satisfy its burden to prove just cause under a
narrow statutory definition,272 but reinstatement is not available as a
remedy. Because these remedies are quite different from what is
available under the employment discrimination statutes, I would not

&

266 I am grateful to Professor Rebecca White for highlighting the compelling civil rights public
policy interest in an employer's not being able to opt of discrimination coverage at the beginning
of the employment relationship.
267 29 U.S.C. § 626(f)(1). The Older Workers Benefit Protection Act expressly states that the
employee does not waive any rights or claims that may arise after the waiver is executed. 29 U.S.C.
§ 626(f)(1)(C); see, e.g., Maurice Wexler, Charles C. Warner, Gary R. Siniscalco, John L. Quinn,
& Adam T. Klein, The Law of Employment Discriminationfrom 1985 to 2010, A.B.A. J. LAB.
EMP. L. 349, 378 (2010).
268 See Michael C. Harper, Age-Based Exit Incentives, Coercion, and the Prospective Waiver of
ADEA Rights: The Failureof the OlderWorkers Benefit ProtectionAct, 79 VA. L. REV. 1271 (1993).
269 Id. at 1342 ("The normative goals of particular laws, including antidiscrimination laws, of
course may be compromised to serve other social goals.").
270 P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 29 §§ 185a-m (2010).
271 Farinacci-F6rn6s, supra note 24, at 127-29.
272 Id. at 143-45.
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favor such remedies in the federally approved statute. However, the
Puerto Rico law provides another existing statute that should be
considered in developing the approved law.
I admit that crafting a set of remedies that both holds employment
discrimination victims harmless and has some appeal for employers is
challenging. It seems to me, however, that the beginning point must be
the remedies currently available under the federal discrimination
laws.273 However, some downward variations in the discrimination
remedies, such as elimination of punitive damages or caps on front pay,
such as proposed by Professor Befort, may be reasonable compromises
in view of the fact that improved chances of recovery of lower amounts
under a wrongful discharge law could be a more valuable protection
than the poor success rates in recovering better remedies under current

discrimination law.
The burden of proof, or more precisely, burdens of production and
persuasion under the state statutes is a matter that could prove crucial
to the balancing of the goals of holding harmless victims of
discrimination and simultaneously giving employers something that
makes the law palatable. Both the META274 and the Montana Wrongful

Discharge Act275 place the burden of proving lack of good cause on the
plaintiff employee. The employment discrimination statutes and
disparate treatment pretext (McDonnell Douglas) and mixed-motives
proof frameworks place the initial burden of production on the plaintiff
employee, but they also have shifting burdens of production for the
pretext analysis and persuasion for the mixed-motives framework.
Although the individual disparate treatment and disparate impact proof
frameworks in the current employment discrimination law function in
different ways regarding burdens of production and persuasion, the
McDonnell Douglas pretext proof structure is by far the predominant
framework used in discrimination law.276 The proof frameworks have
been, in the view of many, one of the most significant and unnecessary

problems and obsessions of the employment discrimination doctrine.277
An interwoven question is to what standard of causation must the party
with the burden of persuasion satisfy. Although these matters could be

273 Of course, as noted earlier, the remedies under the Age Discrimination Act are different
than the remedies under Title VII and the Americans with Disabilities Act. See supra note 261.
274 See MODEL EMP. TERMINATION ACT § 6(e) (NAT'L CONF. OF COMM'RS OF UNIF. STATE L.
(1991).

275 See, e.g., Parker, supra note 8, at 375.
276 Use of the pretext framework imposes a shifting burden of production similar to the
"hybrid"scheme proposed by Professor Hirsch. See Hirsch, supra note 193, at 123.
277 See, e.g., William R. Corbett, Breaking Dichotomies at the Core of Employment
Discrimination Law, 45 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 763 (2018).
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left to the states to resolve differently,278 I think it is important enough
that the federal legislation should specify what a qualifying state statute
must provide on these issues. Ultimately, the state wrongful discharge
statutes are changing the default rule on termination by requiring that

employers fire only for good or just cause. It is difficult for plaintiff
employees to prove the negative-that the employer did not have good
cause, until the employer articulates its good cause reason.
Furthermore, plaintiffs generally have less information than employers

about the reasons for which employers take adverse employment
actions.279 Still, consistent with the META, the Montana Act, and civil
litigation generally, I proposed that plaintiff employees have the initial
burdens of production and persuasion. However, in the context of laws
that require employers to have good cause, it seems that shifting

burdens, as used in the employment discrimination frameworks, would
be suitable. Under the shifting burdens of production of the pretext
analysis, with which courts are familiar and which they routinely apply
in many types of employment cases, the plaintiff would be required to
establish a prima facie case that the employer did not have good cause
to fire her, and then the burden of production would shift to the
employer to produce evidence of a good, job-related reason for the
discharge. The burden of production would then shift to the plaintiff,
who would have an opportunity to prove that the reason given by the
employer was pretextual. The prima facie case is easily satisfied under
current law, thus requiring employers in almost all cases to present

evidence of good cause. 280 I am troubled, however, that the ultimate
burden of persuasionof proving that the employer did not, at the butfor level of causation, fire for good cause remains on the plaintiff
employee if the McDonnell Douglas pretext analysis is followed. The
Supreme Court has been clear that the burden ofpersuasionnever shifts
and remains on the plaintiff at all stages of the pretext analysis.281 This
concern suggests that the mixed-motives framework originally
developed in Price Waterhouse and modified by Congress in the Civil
Rights Act of 1991 would be more appropriate.282 Under that

framework, the initial burden of proving that the illegal factor was a

278 It is noteworthy that Professor St. Antoine, in a law review article before he became the
reporter on the META, urged that legislation not address burden and quantum of proof. See
Theodore J. St. Antoine, A Seed Germinates: UnjustDischargeReform Heads TowardFullFlower,
67 NEB. L. REV. 56, 72 (1988) (urging that "[t]he statute should probably remain discreetly silent
on such items as the burden and the quantum of proof').
279 See Hirsch, supra note 193, at 122.
280 See supratext accompanying notes 123-27.
281 See, e.g., St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993).
282 See supra notes 143-45 and accompanying text.
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"motivating factor" rests on the plaintiff, and if the plaintiff satisfies that
burden, there is a violation of Title VII.283 The burden ofpersuasionthen
shifts to the defendant employer to prove that, notwithstanding the
illegal motivation, it would have taken the same adverse action for a
legitimate reason, which does not avoid liability but instead
significantly limits remedies.284 Ultimately, I think the burden of
persuasion of proving that a good reason was a but-for cause for
termination should rest with the employer. 'That result could be
achieved by an adjustment of the mixed-motives framework: the initial
burden of production and persuasion at a low level of causation should
rest with the plaintiff employee, and if the plaintiff satisfied that burden,

the burdens of production and persuasion should shift to the defendant
employer to prove, at the level of but-for causation, that it took the
adverse action for good cause, which would avoid a violation and
liability.
Another critical issue regarding the approved law is the
mechanism for adjudication of claims. The META offers several
possibilities.285 The META favors a state-run arbitration system in
which a state agency adopts rules for the qualifications, method of
selection, and appointment of arbitrators as the adjudicatory
mechanism. 286 However, it also permits employers and employees, after
a dispute arises, to agree in writing to private arbitration or other
288
The
alternative dispute resolution287 or to resolution in the courts.
appendices to the META provide other options, including a state
employing full-time civil service or other government personnel as
29
hearing officers289 or leaving adjudication to the civil courts. o The
Montana Wrongful Discharge Act favors arbitration through the
mechanism of an offer to arbitrate and the incentive that a prevailing

employee who made an offer to arbitrate that was accepted is entitled to
have the arbitrator's fees and all costs of arbitration paid by the
employer.291 The prevalent use by employers of mandatory arbitration
clauses is an issue of great concern. Since 1997, the EEOC maintained

an official policy statement opposing the application of mandatory
arbitration clauses to federal discrimination claims as a condition of

283 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m).
284 Id. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B).
285 See generally St. Antoine, The Making of the Model, supra note 252, at 376-79.
286 MODEL EMP. TERMINATION ACT

§§

5-6 (Nat'l Conf. COMM'RS UNIF. STATE L. 1991).

287 Id. § 4(i).
288 Id. § 4(j).
289 Id. app. Alternative A.
290 Id. app. Alternative B.
291 MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-914(4) (1993).
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employment,292 but in 2019, the EEOC, by a divided vote, rescinded that
policy statement. 293 On the other hand, bills have been introduced in
Congress several times during the last decade that would prohibit pre-

dispute mandatory arbitration agreements. 294
My principal requirement for the federally approved law would be

that it provide a vehicle by which employees could assert claims, at least
initially, without the necessity of filing lawsuits in the civil courts. I
think this is critical, both because employees often cannot get
representation or afford to pursue claims in court295 and because the law
is taking discriminatory termination claims out of coverage of federal
laws that have a federal agency, the EEOC, with which employees must
file claims before filing lawsuits. That agency investigates charges and
attempts to resolve them without the necessity oflitigation in the courts.
Ultimately, either the agency or the employee may file a lawsuit in the
courts. There are also state and local fair employment practice agencies
(FEPAs) in many states, and these agencies handle discrimination
claims with the EEOC, usually pursuant to work sharing agreements. 296
The states may be able to retool or repurpose these FEPAs to handle
wrongful discharge claims, since presumably their workloads would
decrease with the removal of termination claims from federal
employment discrimination law. I prefer the vehicle of specialized labor
agencies or tribunals at the state level, 297 similar to the Employment
Tribunals in the United Kingdom298 or the Labour Courts of France.299
In the end, I suppose that states would be given some flexibility
regarding fora for the adjudication of claims with a couple of options,

292 See EEOC Notice No. 915.002, Policy Statement on Mandatory Binding Arbitration of
Employment Discrimination Disputes as a Condition of Employment (July 10, 1997).
293 See Commission Votes: December 2019, EEOC (Dec. 2019), https://www.eeoc.gov/
commission-votes-december-2019 [https://perma.cc/TJ4Q-3J6A].
294 The most recent version is the Forced Arbitration Injustice Repeal Act or the "FAIR Act."
H.R. 1423, 116th Cong. (2019).
295 See, e.g., Ann C. Hodges, Mediation and the Transformationof American Labor Unions, 69
MO. L. REV. 365, 372-73 (2004) (explaining that "many employees simply lack the means to
enforce their statutory rights"); Ann C. Hodges, The Limits of Multiple Rights and Remedies: A
Call for Revisiting the Law of the Workplace, 22 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 601, 609 (2005);
Michael Z. Green, FindingLawyers for Employees in Discrimination Disputes as a Critical
Prescriptionfor Unions to Embrace RacialJustice, 7 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 55, 57 (2004).
296 FY 2012 EEOC/FEPA Model Worksharing Agreement, EEOC https://www.eeoc.gov/fy2012-eeocfepa-model-worksharing-agreement [https://perma.cc/GEJ9-HMF2].
297 See, e.g., Hirsch, supranote 193, at 126.
298 See, e.g., John A. Durkalski, FixingEconomic Flexibilization:A Role for Flexible Work Laws
in the Workplace PolicyAgenda, 30 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 381, 398 (2009); Employment
Tribunal, GOV.UK https://www.gov.uk/courts-tribunals/employment-tribunal.
299 See, e.g., Pete Burgess, Susan Corby & Paul L. Latreille, Lay Judges and Labor Courts: A
Question of Legitimacy, 35 COMPAR. LAB. L. &POL'Y J. 191, 195 (2014).
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as under the META. I do not, however, favor permitting the option of
initial adjudication in the state civil courts for many reasons, including
the state courts' lack of experience with wrongful termination cases, the
potential for overburdening dockets with a new type of frequently
asserted claim, and most significantly, the difficulty for employees to
obtain representation. 300

Two other issues of exclusivity merit attention. First, should
discharge claims be removed from coverage under the state
employment discrimination laws? Consistent with the objectives of the
proposed tradeoff, I think they should be. However, under the
cooperative federalism approach that I favor, I think it would be
appropriate to leave that decision to the states. A second issue is

whether exclusivity of remedy should be expanded by Congress beyond
the removal of termination claims from the federal employment
discrimination laws.301 At the federal level, termination claims could be
removed from all federal laws, such as the anti-retaliation provisions in
other federal employment laws, including the Fair Labor Standards
Act302 and the Family and Medical Leave Act,303 and an array of federal

whistleblower statutes. 304 Both Professor Befort and Professor Hirsch
proposed federal wrongful discharge laws that superseded almost all

termination claims. Such broader exclusivity would be consistent with
the goal of giving employers something of value in the trade to

compensate for the loss of employment at will.305 Although I think that
such broader exclusivity would in theory be a good result, it goes
beyond the trade-off for which I have argued based on the interaction
between employment at will and employment discrimination law, and
it is fraught with procedural difficulties. Such a change would divest

federal agencies other than the EEOC of their authority over
termination claims and shift that authority to the states. The fora that
adjudicate the state wrongful discharge claims could be overwhelmed
with what were formerly retaliation claims under other federal laws,
such as the Fair Labor Standards Act and the Family and Medical Leave
Act. Moreover, the broader removal of termination claims from
coverage under other federal laws would require attention to the

300 On the other hand, Professor Hirsch considered the courts as the best forum available
unless and until specialty courts or tribunals are created. See Hirsch, supra note 193, at 127.
301 Professor Hirsch proposes a federal termination law that would supersede all termination
claims. Hirsch, supranote 193.
302 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3).
303 29 U.S.C. 4 2615(a)(2).
304 See generally WhistleblowerProtection,U.S. DEP'T OF LAB.
https://www.whistleblowers.gov/about-us [https://perma.cc/LA66-ZAJY].
305 Befort, Millennium, supra note 47, at 427.
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remedies and other aspects of those laws to ensure that the state
wrongful discharge laws would provide at least roughly equivalent
protections to those provided by the federal laws. Ultimately, I do not
propose such broad removal from coverage of termination claims.
Regarding which employers must be covered by the state wrongful
discharge laws, the floor should be that established by Title VII and the
ADA-fifteen or more employees.30s This again would preserve
protections available under the federal employment discrimination
laws. States also should be granted the flexibility to cover smaller
employers, as some do under state discrimination laws.
As I said, I do not attempt to resolve all the specifics of the
minimum standards for a federally approved law because my principal
purpose is to initiate discussion about a different and innovative
approach to eliminating employment at will and improving
employment discrimination law. If this approach gains favor, there are
existing laws and proposed laws that should be considered, and there is
a large body of scholarship regarding what should be included in a
wrongful discharge law. Nonetheless, I have considered some aspects
that are important in crafting a law that achieves two objectives:
providing comparable protections to the federal employment
discrimination laws and providing some benefits to employers from the
tradeoff that may minimize employer resistance to the abrogation of
employment at will.

III.

ANTICIPATING AND RESPONDING TO OBJECTIONS TO A
COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM APPROACH

Because I am making an unconventional proposal that involves
fundamental changes in the employment law of the United States, I wish

to address some likely objections to the proposal.
A.

Sacrificingthe Rights and ProtectionsofDiscriminationVictims

The most fervent version of this objection is likely to be that the
rights and protections of African Americans, women, and others who

have borne the brunt of discrimination historically are being sacrificed
or traded in order to achieve good-cause protection for all. There may
be milder variations of that objection, but all involve a concern with

306

The ADEA has a higher floor-twenty or more employees. 29 U.S.C. § 630(b).
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307
removing the federal condemnation of discriminatory terminations.
I am sensitive to this argument. Indeed, it is the displacing of the
discrimination claims for terminations that causes me to insist on state
laws that provide remedies and adjudicatory mechanisms that
approximate those available under the federal discrimination laws.
Professor Hirsch astutely observes that the most controversial effect of
eliminating termination claims from the discrimination laws is the
symbolic impact of "tak[ing] away some of the advantages that come
from a clear statement of policy to root out discrimination in the
workplace."308 While I think the symbolic effect is a significant cost of
this proposal, as I explain below, the practical advantages of removing

termination claims from discrimination law outweigh the admitted
cost.

First, the unavailability of general good cause protection and the
availability of protection provided by the discrimination laws has
created a legal regime in which numerous plaintiffs who are discharged
try to assert their claims under the discrimination laws regardless of the
strength of the discrimination claim. The extent of this "square peg;
round hole"309 phenomenon is hard to estimate, but courts seem to have
reacted to it by developing weaker-than-needed doctrine under the
discrimination statutes. Thus, to the extent the discrimination laws are
being used as wrongful discharge laws,310 the anti-discrimination
purpose is being diluted and the discrimination law is being weakened:
Relatedly, to the extent that people in the United States believe that
members of "protected classes" have protection against termination
that others do not, that perception of the discrimination laws caii
engender a resentment regarding the laws and a friction in society that
is antithetical to the goals of the discrimination laws.311
Second, the only type of claim that would be removed from
coverage under the employment discrimination laws is termination
claims. All other adverse employment actions would remain covered by
the discrimination laws. Termination is the ultimate adverse
employment action, and its consequences can be devastating to a fired
307 Professor Befort, recognizing the importance of the "societal goal of eradicating
discrimination in the workplace," proposes displacing termination claims from coverage under
the federal discrimination laws but creating enhanced remedies if a plaintiff proves a
discriminatory reason for termination. Befort, Millennium, supra note 47, at 429. Professor
Hirsch, who advocates for adoption of a federal termination law that displaces termination claims
under the federal discrimination laws, recognizes that this is one of the most controversial aspects
on his proposed federal law. See Hirsch, supranote 193, at 138.
308 Hirsch, supra note 193, at 138.
309 See supranote 190 (discussing Professor Fischl's depiction of this phenomenon).
310 See supraSection I.B.3.
311 See supra Section I.B.3.
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employee in many ways, including preventing her from fully
participating in the rights and privileges of citizenship.312 Termination
thus inflicts harm on society at large. Because of the significant harm
flowing from termination, it is appropriate to deal with this one
particular adverse employment action under a law providing equal
protection to all.
Third, this is a proposed trade, and the value of what is being given
up and what could be gained should be assessed. The success rate of
plaintiffs in employment discrimination litigation generally is quite
bad.313 Balanced against the value of an abysmal success rate for
plaintiffs in employment discrimination cases is the value of a wrongful
discharge claim that would appear to offer a better chance of success on
discriminatory termination claims,314 as well as other termination

claims. In addition to victims of discriminatory discharges having better
prospects for recovery under a general termination law, the courts, free
from concern about weakening employment at will, can develop more
robust employment discrimination doctrine for other adverse
employment actions once the baggage of termination claims is
removed.
In the end, it is true that something with both real and symbolic
value is being traded, but what is being gained should offer greater value
in terms of increased chance of recovery by plaintiffs, improved
discharge law, improved employment discrimination law, and more
positive and less divisive societal perception of employment law.
B.

Findinga Line of DemarcationBetween Adverse Actions

The EEOC and state and local FEPAs will be faced with drawing a
line between claims that are covered by the employment discrimination
laws and termination claims, which will no longer be within their
jurisdiction. This line drawing is likely to be particularly necessary

regarding claims of hostile environment harassment that end in

312 See supra notes 33-45 and accompanying text.
313 See supranote 61; Hirsch, supra note 193, at 133-34.
314 As Professor Hirsch explains,
The law of termination's potential effect on Title VII is deceptively simple. Legally, the
proposal would greatly simplify termination claims that allege discrimination. This
simplification improves enforcement, but it also alters the perceptions of employers,
employees, and judges. This shift promises to alleviate hostility against claims of
discrimination and, in turn, make it easier for employees who are truly victims of
discriminatory acts to seek redress.
Hirsch, supranote 193, at 142.
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termination and claims of constructive discharge. This a real and
significant issue, but not a unique one. For example, in the United
Kingdom, the law recognizes a common law claim for breach of the

implied contract term of mutual trust and confidence and a statutory
claim for unfair dismissal.315 Recovery of compensatory and possibly
punitive damages for the emotional distress caused by harassment and
discriminatory conduct is available under Section 1981(a).316 Remedies
for a discriminatory termination, such as backpay, front pay, and
possibly reinstatement would be recoverable under the wrongful
discharge law. The necessity of drawing lines between recoveries and
specifying the damages recoverable for different claims is a common
issue in the law.
C.

InadequateIncentives for States to Enact Wrongful Discharge
Laws

It is hard to know whether any states would exercise the option
under this approach if Congress made it available. One could argue that

employers would not support such legislation because they would.be
subject to liability under general wrongful discharge laws rather than
more limited liability under the employment discrimination laws.317 I
have argued, however, that it would be better for employers, employees,
the state of the law, and society in general, if employers did not have to

defend so many claims ofdiscriminatory termination. Terminations are
the most adverse of all adverse employment actions, leading to extreme
emotions and antipathy. When that is mixed with allegations of
discrimination, which often are understood to be allegations of racism,
bigotry, or sexism, it is a volatile mix that results in heated litigation and
8
sometimes scars on relations and tensions in society.31 Employers may
not lobby for such a change, but the public may see it as a change that

315 Katherine M. Apps, Good Faith Performancein Employment Contracts:A "Comparative
Conversation"Between the U.S. and England, 8 U. PA. J. LAB. &EMP. L. 883 (2006). The "Johnson
exclusion area" is the term applied to the boundary line providing essentially that termination
claims must be pursued under the statutory wrongful dismissal cause of action, not the common
law cause of action. Id. at 937-38. Although this line of demarcation is not as easy to apply as it
is to state, the employment tribunals make a distinction.
316 42 U.S.C. § 1981a.
317 As mentioned above, employers would get more out of the ttade if termination claims were
removed from the coverage of all federal laws, not just the employment discrimination laws. See
supra notes 301-05 and accompanying text. However, such broader removal is more challenging
for the reasons mentioned above.
318 See supraSection I.B.3.
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is good for both the law and society and may call upon their legislators
to make such a change.
Furthermore, as discussed above, employers do not, under current
law, function as though they can fire without good cause. 319 Thus, the
enactment of state wrongful discharge laws sounds as if it takes from
employers their valuable "divine right,"320 but the right actually does not
have great practical value. Most employers would not find it necessary
to make drastic changes in their approaches and procedures regarding
discharge if states enacted wrongful discharge statutes. States should be
willing to deprive employers of a "right" that they may value well
beyond its actual worth in order to improve employment law and
society.
CONCLUSION

Employment at will is an aberrant approach to employment
termination that is unique to the United States. Prodigious are the
criticisms of this law and the proposals to replace it with wrongful
discharge legislation. Such proposals have called for enactment ofeither
federal or state wrongful discharge statutes. But such laws are not going
to be enacted at either level. I propose a different approach: a
cooperative federalism approach whereby the federal government
creates an incentive for states to enact state laws that comply with
specified federal minimum criteria. The trade-off is that termination
claims are removed from coverage under the federal employment
discrimination laws. This proposal is based on the relationship between
employment at will and employment discrimination law in which each
is the most significant weakness of the other.
The approach I propose is controversial. Moreover, resolving all
the details of such a significant change would be daunting. This
approach involves a trade in which things of value are given up for the
prospect of producing something better. This is not easy. Yet, a

multitude of other proposals over many decades has not produced a
change. Consequently, the myth of employment at will persists, and
courts continue to render inadequate employment discrimination
doctrine. A different approach is needed. When neither Congress nor
the states will act, cooperative federalism offers a way to engage both.
I entertain no illusion that Congress will leap to action to
implement this proposal. However, I hope to provoke new

examinations of the overestimated value of both employment at will to
See supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text.
320 See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
319
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employers and employment discrimination claims to putative victims
of discriminatory terminations. We need to acknowledge that the
employment at will and employment
relationship between
discrimination law results in bad or weak law and detrimental effects
on society. Furthermore, I hope to incite discussion of how the federal
and state governments might work together to improve the state of law
and concomitantly the state of society. Perhaps, if these matters are
considered and debated, Congress and state legislatures will decide that
the time has come to fire employment at will and to discharge
termination claims from employment discrimination law.
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